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I. Introduction
With the exception of the United States, industrial countries
were severely enfeebled by the Second World War, but proceeded
to enjoy, for the first time since the Great Depression, over two
decades of continuing prosperity.' This period was not devoid of
cyclical shifts in the pace of economic activity and challenges to
financial stability, but on the whole, the dynamism exhibited and
t Visiting Professor of Managerial Economics, MBA Program, College of Business
Administration, University of Northern Iowa and Adjunct Professor of International
Economics and Finance, Graduate Division, Faculty of Social Science, Chinese
University of Hong Kong
t Professor of International Law, Hopkins-Nanjing Center, Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University and Honorary
Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong
I See Sara Burke & Claudio Puty, The Post World War II Golden Age of
Capitalism and the Crisis of the 1970s, GLOVES OFF, www.glovesoff.org/
features/gjamerical.htmi (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
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progress recorded justifies its portrayal as the "golden age of...
capitalism."2 This period was also a phase in the evolution of the
global economy characterized by a meaningful degree of
international cooperation and institution-building-as evidenced
by the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and USD-
based gold exchange standard.
The steady forward movement came to an end in the 1970s,
when economic expansion, coupled with price stability, gave way
to stubborn stagflation. ' The conventional-style "Keynesian"
policies, featuring fiscal and monetary laxity, were believed to be
largely responsible for the malaise and therefore were significantly
discredited.' The post-1945 overarching edifice of embedded
liberalism, broadly and collectively combining trade openness with
the pursuit of domestic welfare,' displayed enormous strains and
effectively unraveled. One of the most concrete manifestations of
the sharp deterioration in the global economic climate, notably the
serious decline in international cooperation and widespread
reversion to strategies reflecting narrow national interests, was the
collapse of the elaborate Bretton Woods exchange rate regime and
the shift to a free-floating system. 8
Mature industrial economies regained momentum in the 1980s
in a pattern attributed to the disciplined and, for the most part,
"market-friendly" or "supply-side oriented" policies of




5 See generally ROBERT J. SAMUELSON, THE GREAT INFLATION: THE PAST AND
FUTURE OF AMERICAN AFFLUENCE (2008) (arguing that social, political, and
psychological pressures give rise to the cyclical nature of the United States' economy).
6 See generally John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and
Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic System, 36 INT'L ORG. 379,
379-415 (1982) (differentiating "embedded liberalism" from liberal international
economic order and laissez-faire liberalism).
7 See MARK BLYTH, GREAT TRANSFORMATIONS: ECONOMIC IDEAS AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 126-250 (2002).
8 Although significant, this deterioration of the global economic climate was still
not as drastic as in the period between World War One and World War Two. See BARRY
J. EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
SYSTEM 93-135 (1996).
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centrist successors.9 The strategies followed have been closely
associated with the names of trail-blazing individual leaders and
have found symbolic expression in terms such as Reagonomics,'o
Thatcherism, " Clintonomics, 12 and Blairism. " However, the
developed world has not experienced a genuine economic
renaissance. 14 Rates of growth have generally been satisfactory,
but scarcely impressive." The upward trajectory has also been
uneven, as evidenced by the immense severity of the 2008-09
"Great Recession." 6
When a commodity becomes scarce, its perceived value
normally increases in markets for both goods and ideas.'7 Insofar
as the market for ideas is concerned, it typically attracts more
attention and intellectual resources.'" Economic dynamism, while
an abstract concept rather than a tangible product, is no exception
9 See generally MATTHIAS MATHIJS, IDEAS AND ECONOMIC CRISES IN BRITAIN FROM
ATTLEE TO BLAIR (1945-2005) (2011) (analyzing why Thatcher and Attlee were so
successful with regard to economic policy); BRIAN DOMITROVic, ECONOCLASTS: THE
REBELS WHO SPARKED THE SUPPLY-SIDE REVOLUTION AND RESTORED AMERICAN
PROSPERITY (2012) (discussing the impact of supply-side economics).
10 See generally BRUCE R. BARTLETT, REAGONOMICS: SUPPLY-SIDE REVOLUTION IN
ACTION (1981) (describing Ronald Reagan's political and economic policies).
II See generally ERIC J. EVANS, THATCHER AND THATCHERISM (2004) (describing
Margaret Thatcher's political and economic policies).
12 See generally JACK GODWIN, CLINTONOMICS: How BILL CLINTON REENGINEERED
THE REAGAN REVOLUTION (2009) (describing William Clinton's political and economic
policies).
13 See generally Gyorgy Simon, Jr., The Impact of the British Model on Economic
Growth, ECON. ANNALS, Dec. 31, 2007, at 45, available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1288591 (describing Tony Blair's political and economic
policies)..
14 See generally NIALL FERGUSON, THE GREAT DEGENERATION: How INSTITUTIONS
DECAY AND ECONOMIES DIE (2012) (exploring causes of the "stationary state").
15 See id. at 1-20.
16 See generally DAVID BECKWORTH, BOOM AND BUST BANKING: THE CAUSES AND
CURES OF THE GREAT RECESSION (2012) (discussing the 2008 economic collapse); ALAN
S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, AND THE
WORK AHEAD (2013) (discussing the immense financial liabilities of banks and other
holding companies).
17 See DAVID COLANDER, MACROECONOMICS 85 (9th ed. 2012) (Stating that
"[w]hen quantity demanded is greater than quantity supplied, prices tend to rise.").
18 See HENDRIK VAN DEN BERG, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT: AN
ANALYSIS OF OUR GREATEST ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS AND OUR MOST EXCITING
CHALLENGES 2-29 (2d ed., 2012).
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to the rule.19 Where and when it turns elusive, the quest for
gaining a better appreciation of its underpinnings tends to widen
and intensify.20 This pattern has been amply observed in the past
three decades or so, a period characterized by an accelerating and
progressively more sophisticated search-across the entire social
science spectrum and beyond-for clues to the determinants of
economic growth and development.2 1
A notable feature of the process has been the discovery, or
rediscovery, of the crucial role played by institutions in social life
generally, 22 and in influencing economic performance
particularly. 23 The scholarly inquiries geared toward shedding
light on this relationship have followed two parallel paths. On the
first, especially constitutional economists, have made analytical
efforts to identify demand-side and supply-side institutional
impediments, often political in nature, to the efficient functioning
of established Western capitalist systems. On the second path, a
major subject of empirical and policy-oriented research has
emerged, due to the considerable admiration from social scientists
of the vibrancy exhibited by fundamentally different forms of




22 See generally JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING
INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS (1989) (contextualizing social
stratification as a political and economic mechanism).
23 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, & James A. Robinson,
Institutions as Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth I HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH 385-472 (2005); RICHARD R. NELSON, TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH (2005); DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES:
GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS, ECONOMIC GROWTH (2007); JUSTIN F. LIN, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITION: THOUGHT, STRATEGY, AND VIABILITY (2009); DARON
ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER,
PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012). See generally LANCE E. DAVIS & DOUGLASS C.
NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH (1971) (examining
the long-term economic effects of social, political, and institutional change).
24 See Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, Conversationalism, Constitutional
Economics, and Bicameralism: Strategies for Political Reform in Hong Kong, 13 ASIAN
J. POL. SC. 23, 23-50 (2005) [hereinafter Mushkat, Strategies for Political Reform in
Hong Kong]; Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Economic Dimension of Hong
Kong's Basic Law: An Analytical Overview, 7 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT'L L. 273, 273-316
(2009) [hereinafter Mushkat, An Analytical Overview].
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industrializers in the Eastern hemisphere.2 5
The first strategy has typically yielded neo-liberal insights
designed to shield market institutions from untoward political
influences. The advocated measures have included: balanced-
budget constitutional provisions; tax and expenditure limitations; a
line-item veto (permitting the head of the executive branch to
exercise veto power over the budget on an item-by-item basis); an
item-reduction veto (providing similar authority to curtail the level
of funds without removing the entire item from the budget); tax
earmarking (using taxes to strictly fund a specific category of
expenditure by imposing the burden entirely on the beneficiaries);
regulatory restrictions; mandatory voter consent for fiscal
initiatives; and supermajority requirements (e.g., two-thirds
majority for tax proposals) for economically significant legislative
schemes.2 6
In the same vein, ideas have been floated to enhance efficiency
and liberty-and, by implication, reinvigorate the economic
25 See generally CHALMERS A. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE
GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1973 (1982) (evaluating Japan's "lifetime"
employment system, seniority wage system, and enterprise unionism); FREDERIC C.
DEYO, ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM (1987)
(encouraging filler integration of the Asian industrialization into mainstream
development theory); ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA'S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE
INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989) (exploring the areas of growth during East Asia's industrial
revolution); ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE
OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1990) (analyzing the role of the
state in creating and implementing economic policies); WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN
MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993) (defining Asia's role in the
"export-push" strategy); ANDREW J. MACINTYRE, BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT IN
INDUSTRIALIZING ASIA (1994) (exploring the nature of relations between business and
government in Northeast and Southeast Asia); PETER B. EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY:
STATES AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION (1995) (asserting that the role of the state is
increasingly economic in nature); STEVE CHAN, CAL CLARK, & DANNY LAM, BEYOND
THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: EAST ASIA'S ECONOMIES RECONSIDERED (1998) (presenting
general theoretical and substantive critiques of the "developmental state" model);
MEREDITH Woo-CUMINGS, THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE (1999) (explaining the theory of
the "development state"); MING XIA, THE DUAL DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR CHINA'S TRANSITION (2000)
(discussing the limitations of the "development state" model); KA H. MOK & RAY
FORREST, CHANGING GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EAST ASIA (2009) (exploring
how countries have variably implemented capitalist-based policies in their respective
countries).
26 See Mushkat, Strategies for Political Reforn in Hong Kong, supra note 24, at 37;
Mushkat, An Analytical Overview, supra note 24, at 287-88.
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edifice-by rendering the Bill of Rights more conducive to
safeguarding individual rights against infringements by other
parties, rulers, and fellow citizens, and by introducing an
Economic Bill of Rights.2 7 The underlying argument has been that
such rights have not been afforded sufficient constitutional,
statutory, regulatory, and judicial protection-a pattern that has
become increasingly pronounced in recent years.2 8 This assertion
has specifically and vigorously been directed at rights relating to
property.2 9 The focus has not been on property rights in the broad
sense of the term, but the rights of both individuals and groups to
control property uses (a domain where, for example, the issue of
trespassing arises).30
While this is commonly perceived to be the realm of scholars
in the field of political science, the neo-liberal quest of
constitutional economists for an institutional fagade supportive of
private sector dynamism has extended into areas with which
questions of government accountability, responsiveness,
organizational flexibility, and transparency are systematically
grappled with. " In the process, researchers have favorably
explored a host of strategic options-including citizen-initiated
legislation, readily enacted referenda, strict term limits for
politicians, uncomplicated recall of public officials, meaningful
disclosure across entire executive and legislative branches of
governments, and flattening of the centralized policy apparatus
with a view toward firmly embedding it in the community and
substantially enhancing its information gathering-processing-
utilization capabilities.3 2
Such "participationist" blueprints, designed to circumvent
malfunctioning representative institutions that are thought to
27 See Mushkat. Strategies for Political Reform in Hong Kong, supra note 24, at
37-38; Mushkat, An Analytical Overview, supra note 24, at 284.
28 See Mushkat. Strategies for Political Reform in Hong Kong, supra note 24, at 38;
Mushkat, An Analytical Overview, supra note 24, at 284.
29 See Mushkat, Strategies for Political Reform in Hong Kong, supra note 24, at
38; Mushkat, An Analytical Overview, supra note 24, at 284.
30 See Mushkat , Strategies for Political Reform in Hong Kong, supra note 24, at
38; Mushkat, An Analytical Overview, supra note 24, at 284.
31 See Mushkat, Strategies for Political Reforn in Hong Kong, supra note 24, at 38;
Mushkat, An Analytical Overview, supra note 24, at 284-85.
32 See Mushkat, Strategies for Political Reform in Hong Kong, supra note 24, at 38;
Mushkat, An Analytical Overview, supra note 24, at 284-85.
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impede the expression of true preferences by citizens, amounting
to manifestations of direct democracy, have not been conceived in
isolation without reference to prevailing political realities. "
Considerable intellectual resources have also been channeled
toward potentially improving the functioning of the "middlemen,"
the organizational vehicles that convert grassroots demands into
concrete strategies in the indirect democracy segment of the
political arena.34 Interestingly, the "representationist" schemes
examined and recommended have departed in several respects
from the neo-liberal credo pervading constitutional economics."
Some of the issues addressed, in an essentially empirical and
largely neutral fashion, merely concern the economic
consequences of different institutional configurations-for
example, presidential versus parliamentary regimes or unicameral
versus bicameral legislatures. 3 However, there is often an
additional analytical element that cannot readily be reconciled with
the neo-liberal ethos. Specifically, the merits of corporatist
systems-entailing close top-down cooperation between
government officials, the business sector, and labor, as seen in
some Northern European countries-are highlighted, and evidence
is presented to demonstrate that they may engender prosperity and
stability in certain circumstances. Whether valid or not, the
claim is scarcely in tune with the predominantly bottom-up,
market-centered proposals emphatically put forward by
constitutional economists.
European-style corporatism is not the sole preserve of
constitutional economists. Its key attributes, notably the German
institutional framework of "social market" capitalism, the active
role played by the State at both the macro and micro levels, as well
as the hierarchical and horizontal patterns of corporate governance
and business relationships, are extensively dissected by political
33 See Mushkat, Strategies for Political Reform in Hong Kong, supra note 24, at 38;
Mushkat, An Analytical Overview, supra note 24, at 284-85.
34 See Mushkat, Strategies for Political Reform in Hong Kong, supra note 24, at
39-46; Mushkat, An Analytical Overview, supra note 24, at 286.
35 See Mushkat, Strategies for Political Reform in Hong Kong, supra note 24, at
39-46; Mushkat, An Analytical Overview, supra note 24, at 286.
36 See Mushkat, Strategies for Political Reform in Hong Kong, supra note 24, at
39-46; Mushkat, An Analytical Overview, supra note 24, at 286.
37 See Mushkat, Strategies for Political Reforinm in Hong Kong, supra note 24, at
44-46.
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economists.3 The latter tend to be more favorably disposed
toward institutional constellations involving partial and potentially
productive reliance on non-market coordination mechanisms.39
The political economy field is also one where generally
sympathetic assessments are provided of the "guided capitalism"
that has characterized East Asia's remarkably successful
modernization.4 0 Those who have been engaged in the search for
lessons that this model offers can be said to have followed the
second strategic path purporting to lead to a better understanding
of economic growth and its management.
Their analytical insights and policy prescriptions revolve
around the concept of the "developmental state." '" This
institutional configuration combines substantial government
direction with a significant degree of civil society/private sector
initiative, coupled with a fairly high measure of organizational
certainty and transparency.42 The key actors in the policy process
share common strategic objectives (with economic growth being
accorded priority over redistribution) and cooperate closely in
seeking their implementation. 43 The state machinery is insulated
from external pressures along Weberian lines (and hence exhibits
neutrality), but at the same time it is firmly rooted in the
surrounding social environment." The barriers shielding it from
38 See ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 168-74 (2001).
39 See id. at 175-79.
40 See id. at 156-68, 175-79; See also KENNETH D. COCKS, DEEP FUTURES: OUR
PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL 24 (2003).
41 See JOHNSON, supra note 25; DEYO, supra note 25; AMSDEN, supra note 25;
WADE, supra note 25; WORLD BANK, supra note 25; MACINTYRE, supra note 25; EVANS,
supra note 25; CHAN, CLARK, & LAM, supra note 25; WOO-CUMINGS (ed.), supra note
25; XIA, supra note 25; MOK & FORREST (eds.), supra note 25.
42 See JOHNSON, supra note 25; DEYO, supra note 25; AMSDEN, supra note 25;
WADE, supra note 25; WORLD BANK, supra note 25; MACINTYRE, supra note 25; EVANS,
supra note 25; CHAN, CLARK, & LAM, supra note 25; WOO-CUMINGS (ed.), supra note
25; XIA, supra note 25; MOK & FORREST (eds.), supra note 25.
43 See JOHNSON, supra note 25; DEYO, supra note 25; AMSDEN, supra note 25;
WADE, supra note 25; WORLD BANK, supra note 25; MACINTYRE, supra note 25; EVANS,
supra note 25; CHAN, CLARK, & LAM, supra note 25; WoO-CUMINGS (ed.), supra note
25; XIA, supra note 25; MOK & FORREST (eds.), supra note 25.
44 See JOHNSON, supra note 25; DEYO, supra note 25; AMSDEN, supra note 25;
WADE, supra note 25; WORLD BANK, supra note 25; MACINTYRE, supra note 25; EVANS,
supra note 25; CHAN, CLARK, & LAM, supra note 25; Woo-CUMINGS (ed.), supra note
25; XIA, supra note 25; MOK & FORREST (eds.), supra note 25.
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partisan pressures, reinforced by deep entrenchment in the
community, furnish it with transformative capacity to foster
change through governed interdependence between public
authorities and private agents.4 5
The original East Asia developmental states have now matured
and have joined the ranks of industrial countries.46 Interest appears
to have shifted to the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and
their successors. 47 This group does not constitute a homogeneous
category, which is a disadvantage from a conceptual and policy
perspective. Nevertheless, certain common features may be
discerned. The countries that are currently attracting attention had
long been at the interventionist end of the strategic continuum, but
are presently liberalizing, albeit in a controlled fashion.48 They are
also almost invariably large. An inference may be drawn that an
institutional cocktail, featuring some optimal blend of spontaneous
bottom-up and thoughtful top-down elements, may provide the
ideal policy formula for sustaining a healthy economic expansion,
and that size too greatly matters in this respect.
Without necessarily challenging the broad thrust of that
argument, it is appropriate to note that it does not properly reflect
the diversity of economic experience. Small countries, frequently
less interventionist and more open than their large counterparts,
often consistently outpace the titans. 4 9  Hong Kong, a former
British colony and, since 1997, a special administrative region
(HKSAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC), is a case in
45 See JOHNSON, supra note 25; DEYO, supra note 25; AMSDEN, supra note 25;
WADE, supra note 25; WORLD BANK, supra note 25; MACINTYRE, supra note 25; EVANS,
supra note 25; CHAN, CLARK, & LAM, supra note 25; Woo-CUMINGs (ed.), supra note
25; XIA, supra note 25; MOK & FORREST (eds.), supra note 25.
46 See JOHNSON, supra note 25; DEYO, supra note 25; AMSDEN, supra note 25;
WADE, supra note 25; WORLD BANK, supra note 25; MACINTYRE, supra note 25; EVANS,
supra note 25; CHAN, CLARK, & LAM, supra note 25; WOO-CUMINGS (ed.), supra note
25; XIA, supra note 25; MOK & FORREST (eds.), supra note 25.
47 See generally JIM O'NEILL, THE GROWTH MAP: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE
BRICS AND BEYOND (2011) (noting Brazil, Russia, India and China's eagerness to enter
the global economic exchange); RUCHIR SHARMA, BREAKOUT NATIONS: IN PURSUIT OF
THE NEXT ECONOMIC MIRACLE (2012) (finding emerging markets such as Russia, Brazil,
and China have a much higher tolerance than richer nations).
48 See O'NEILL, supra note 47.
49 See generally William Easterly & Aart Kray, Small States, Small Problems?,
(World Bank Dev. Res. Group, Working Paper No. WPS2139, 1999) (noting that
"microstates do not appear to be especially open financially" either).
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point. Despite its stellar economic record and distinct institutional
features, it occupies a rather modest place in the literature on
economic development and growth (the equally vibrant yet
differently structured city-state of Singapore is also
marginalized).so The purpose of this paper is to put Hong Kong's
economic architecture back in the spotlight by describing and
assessing its regulation of competition, a process that has recently
culminated in the introduction of legislation to address the issue.
However, the territory's relevant economic and political
characteristics must be outlined first.
Another preliminary step taken is an evaluation of Hong
Kong's overall regulatory regime. Specific measures taken to
correct market failure need to be placed in a broad economic and
political context because such contexts are key determinants of the
particular nature of the measures, although this is not a one-way
relationship. However, such mechanisms are often best
understood as a component of a wider regulatory system, which
may be tightly or loosely integrated, but which is seldom devoid of
any internal coherence. Indeed, the conclusion drawn here is that
the effectiveness of the emerging framework for regulating
competition in Hong Kong must be judged in light of its fit with
the economic, political, and overall micro-level governance regime
in which it is embedded.
II. From a Barren Rock to a Global Metropolis
Although this is not duly captured, qualitatively or
quantitatively, in Western legal and social science writings, Hong
Kong has long served as a source of intellectual fascination. Some
of this fascination has been expressed in the form of casual, but
insightful, observations, " and some has been systematically
articulated.52 Whatever the mode of communication, the appeal
has persistently stemmed from the territory's extraordinary
capacity to deliver-in the face of enormous challenges,
constraints, and vulnerabilities-freedom, prosperity, and
stability." As will be shown in the following section, Hong Kong
has not progressed beyond the stage of "flawed democracy" on the
so See ALVIN RABUSHKA, HONG KONG: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC FREEDOM (1979).
51 See, e.g., JON WORONOFF, HONG KONG: CAPITALIST PARADISE (1980).
52 See, e.g., RABUSHKA, supra note 50.
53 See, e.g., id.; RICHARD CULLEN, THE RULE OF LAW IN HONG KONG (2005).
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political front, but it has nevertheless embraced the rule of law54
and laissez-faire economics 1 in a determined and mostly
successful fashion. In terms of key yardsticks, no jurisdiction
better embodies the neo-liberal institutional vision of a dynamic
economic order.
Hong Kong became a British possession in the mid-nineteenth
century, following a decisive victory over imperial China in the
Opium Wars, which was triggered by a series of diplomatic and
trade disputes.56 The process of colonization began with the
establishment of control over Hong Kong Island and Kowloon
Peninsula. " It accelerated with the acquisition of the New
Territories in the late nineteenth century.5 ' The circumstances
under which the physical expansion initially took place, and the
seemingly dubious quality of the assets obtained, are believed to
have caused Queen Victoria considerable distress.59 Hong Kong
Island amounted to little more than a "barren rock."6 0  "The
original population was sparse, with just a few fishing villages,
and it was also a place for pirates to prey on passing ships." 6 1
The mere act of territorial consolidation boosted economic
activity: "[The] offices of the British companies, some colonial
trappings, a military and naval base, and a veneer of civilization,
put it in business." 6 2 Allowing the Chinese free access to the
island for trading purposes enhanced its attractiveness and turned
it into a magnet for mainlanders-which, in turn, led to rapid
54 See generally RICHARD CULLEN, THE RULE OF LAW IN HONG KONG (2005)
(synthesizing how Hong Kong both protects and advances its Rule of Law).
55 See Edward K.Y. CHEN, BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN HONG KONG, 3-46 (Ng Sek
Hong & David G. Lethbridge eds., 4th ed., 2000); Kul-WAi LI, THE HONG KONG
ECONOMY: RECOVERY AND RESTRUCTURING (2006). See generally RABUSHKA, supra note
50 (explaining the competitive market of Hong Kong in the face of resourcelessness,
political geography, and constitutional and administrative status); MIRON MUSHKAT, THE
ECONOMIC FUTURE OF HONG KONG (1990) (concluding that the Hong Kong economy is
characterized by continuity rather than by reform); DAVID MOLE, MANAGING THE NEW
HONG KONG ECONOMY 1-17 (1996) (characterizing the Hong Kong economy as
"positive non-intervention").
56 See WORONOFF, supra note 51, at 5-6.
57 See id. at 6-7.
58 See id. at 7-8.
59 See id. at 5.
60 See id. at 5-6.
61 See WORONOFF, supra note 51, at 5-6.
62 See id. at 6.
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population growth.6 This, as well as competitive pressures
exerted by France and Russia, prompted the extension of British
control over Kowloon Peninsula and, subsequently, the New
Territories." At that point, the colony "consisted of both sides of
[Victoria Harbor], all approaches to it, and some agricultural land
in the New Territories." Yet, "it was still nothing more than a
rear base for trade with China." 6
Before long, that activity took off dramatically. It continued
to expand at an impressive rate, periodically interrupted by
exogenous shocks, the most severe of which was that unleashed by
the Japanese invasion of the early 1940s. This happened at an
economically difficult juncture because Hong Kong's population
was swelling due to the influx of mainlanders fleeing the harsh
consequences of the Sino-Japanese War, which had erupted a
decade earlier. 69 The heavy and burdensome flow of refugees
resumed as the civil war between the communists and nationalists
reached its climax in the late 1940s.70 When the communists
gained the upper hand, they proceeded to forcefully nationalize the
factors of production, as well as embark on massively disruptive
experiments such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural
Revolution, in the 1950s and 1960s.7' However, Hong Kong's
trading business remained generally robust, defying the pull of
gravity typically prevailing when conditions in the external
environment markedly deteriorate and internal pressures greatly
63 See id. at 6-7.
64 See id. at 7-8.
65 Id. at 8.
66 wORONOFF, supra note 5 1, at 8.
67 See id.
68 See id. at 8.
69 See id. at 8-9.
70 See Li, supra note 55
71 See WORONOFF, supra note 51, at 9; Li, supra note 55, at 3; BERTRAND DE
SPEVILLE, HONG KONG: POLICY INITIATIVES AGAINST CORRUPTION 12-13 (Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1997); Chi-Kwan Mark, The "Problem of
People ": British Colonials, Cold War Powers, and the Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong,
41 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 1145, 1145-81 (2007); Laura Madokoro, Borders Transformed:
Sovereign Concerns, Population Movements, and the Making of Territorial Frontiers in
Hong Kong, 25 J. REFUGEE STUD. 407, 407-27 (2012); Glen Peterson, The Uneven
Development of the International Refugee Regime in Postwar Asia: Evidence from
China, Hong Kong, and Indonesia, 25 J. REFUGEE STUD. 326, 326-43 (2012).
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intensify.7 2
Indeed, rather exceptionally, the British colony turned a
formidable challenge into an overwhelming opportunity by
responding creatively and resourcefully to the threat posed to it by
the imposition of a United Nations embargo against China, on
account of its support for the North during the Korean War waged
in the early 1950s. 7 ' Having experienced a rapid erosion of its
status as a thriving, but geographically limited and relatively low
value-added, China-dependent entrep6t, Hong Kong swiftly
transformed itself into a leading manufacturing center for labor-
intensive consumer goods. 7 4 In the process, it re-oriented itself
toward affluent markets in the developed world, capitalizing on
both buoyant external demand and a rich pool of comparatively
inexpensive, yet skilled workers at home.
Another opportunity of historic proportions presented itself on
much more favorable terms, with the opening up of China in the
late 1970s." It brought to an end Hong Kong's three-decade long
economic estrangement from the mainland and provided the
impetus to reintegration, which is still ongoing.77 As access to
China's low-priced labor and land became readily available, Hong
Kong transferred its labor-intensive manufacturing base across the
border and successfully shifted the focus to capital-intensive and
knowledge-intensive service industries, by then consistent with its
changing factor endowments.7 ' Reintegration with the mainland
was a two-step undertaking, initially shallow and thereafter deep,
72 See WORONOFF, supra note 51, at 8-9; Li, supra note 55, at 3.
73 See DAVID R. MEYER, HONG KONG AS A GLOBAL METROPOLIS 143-78 (2000);
STEPHEN CHIU & TAI-LOK Lui, HONG KONG: BECOMING A CHINESE GLOBAL CITY 26-34
(2009).
74 See MEYER, supra note 73, at 143-78; CHIU & Lul, supra note 73, at 26-34.
75 See MEYER, supra note 73, at 143-78; CHIU & Lui, supra note 73, at 26-34.
76 See NICHOLAS R. LARDY, CHINA'S ENTRY INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTHEAST ASIA AND THE UNITED STATES (1987).
77 See generally YUN-WING SUNG, THE CHINA-HONG KONG CONNECTION: THE KEY
TO CHINA'S OPEN-DOOR POLICY (1991) [hereinafter CHINA'S OPEN-DOOR POLICY]
(explaining China's mainland opening and slow reintegration); YUN-WING SUNG, THE
EMERGENCE OF GREATER CHINA: THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF MAINLAND CHINA,
TAIWAN, AND HONG KONG (2005) (explaining the evolution of China and Hong Kong's
economic relationship) [hereinafter THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION]; see also YUN-WING
SUNG, HONG KONG AND SOUTH CHINA: THE ECONOMIC SYNERGY (1998) [hereinafter THE
ECONOMIC SYNERGY].
78 See CHINA'S OPEN-DOOR POLICY, supra note 77, at 16-28.
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but this distinction should not obscure the fact that structural
adjustment was swift, as witnessed at similar historical junctures."
Deindustrialization proved to be beneficial not only because it
allowed Hong Kong to lessen its dependence on increasingly low-
margin exports that, owing to steadily climbing labor and land
costs, were beginning to lose their competitiveness, but also in
allowing Hong Kong to move up the value chain by reinventing
itself as China's facilitator, financier, middleman, and trading
partner." The late 1970's, hermetically closed mainland economy
sorely needed an effective bridge to re-engage with the world, and
Hong Kong promptly and decisively stepped in to assume that role
by rapidly developing a wide array of intermediary services whose
breadth and depth enabled it to productively and sustainably
exploit crucial economies of scale and agglomeration."
That dynamic process, which coincided with progressive
liberalization in Taiwan, has transformed Hong Kong into a
vibrant pivot of the so-called "China Circle."8 This informal but
highly integrated economic entity consists of three concentric
layers. " Greater Hong Kong, or the Hong Kong-Guangdong
Province nexus, constitutes the core of this expanding region.84
Greater Southeast China (GSC)-which extends over Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and the southeast coastal provinces of the mainland
(Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Zhejiang)-is
considered to be the inner layer." And Greater China, or the
Chinese Economic Area, is regarded as the outer layer."
However, the portrayal of present-day Hong Kong as the pivot
of a geographically broad and multilayered China Circle falls short
79 See THE ECONOMIC SYNERGY, supra note 77, at 5-8; THE ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION, supra note 77, at 51-52, 54-56.
8o See CHINA'S OPEN-DOOR POLICY, supra note 77, at 16-28.
si See id. at 28-43.
82 See THE ECONOMIC SYNERGY, supra note 77, at 1-2; THE ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION, supra note 77, at 9-10.
83 See THE ECONOMIC SYNERGY, supra note 77, at 1-2; THE ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION, supra note 77, at 9-10.
84 See THE ECONOMIC SYNERGY, supra note 77, at 1-2; THE ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION, supra note 77, at 9-10.
85 See THE ECONOMIC SYNERGY, supra note 77, at 1-2; THE ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION, supra note 77, at 9-10.
86 See THE ECONOMIC SYNERGY, supra note 77, at 1-2; THE ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION, supra note 77, at 9-10.
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of fully reflecting the scope and diversity of its international
economic activities. Hong Kong has evolved into a genuine
"global metropolis," a lofty status attained by only a handful of
cities.17  In a nutshell, this means that "[i]ts intermediaries of
capital, who include traders, financiers, and corporate managers,
have made Hong Kong the [epicenter for] decision-making about
the exchange of capital within Asia and between the region and the
rest of the world."88
There is a distinct duality to this phenomenon in that it
possesses a social, as well as economic dimension, and entails an
elaborate linkage between Chinese and foreign socio-economic
relationship clusters." The point is that Hong Kong intermediaries
operate as "two social networks of capital, a Chinese and a foreign
network, and those networks intersect[ ] . .. " in their global
metropolis. Importantly, "[t]he term 'social networks' emphasizes
that intermediary decision-making about the exchange of capital
rests on bonds that extend beyond pure market calculations of
profit and loss to include deeper, wider social relations."9 Such
ties "are essential to build trust and monitor malfeasant behavior,
thus reducing the risks of exchange."9 2
An intriguing side of the picture is that this sophisticated
operational configuration is not the product of deliberate strategic
design. 9 Rather, it appears to have emerged spontaneously,
notwithstanding Hong Kong's historically peripheral political
position and Britain's consistently modest ambitions for its
colonial outpost on the fringes of the empire.94 After all, "this tiny
87 See generally MEYER, supra note 73 (tracing the history of Hong Kong as a
"global metropolis"); CHIU & LUI, supra note 73 (exploring how Hong Kong grew into
an international economic hub).
88 MEYER, supra note 73, at 1.
89 See generally id. ("Traders and financers in Hong Kong always operated in
multitiered national, world-regional, and global economies."); CHIu & LuI, supra note 73
("Hong Kong's connections with the world economy are an example of. .. the 'buyer-
driven' type ... governance structures in global commodity chains.").
90 MEYER, supra note 73, at 3.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See generally id. (explaining how Hong Kong has become the pivot of decision-
making around the world due to various spontaneous events); CHIU & LuI, supra note 73
(discussing the multitude of factors that contributed to Hong Kong's rapid industrial
growth).
94 See MEYER, supra note 73, at 1-2.
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island and adjacent peninsula could not even lay claim to status as
a city-state."9 s By the same token, "[t]he British viewed Hong
Kong as their emporium of trade in the Far East, but they did not
aspire to transform it into a commercial-military power similar to
the earlier aggressive city-states of Genoa and Venice." 9 6 Notably,
"during World War II, Britain conceded Hong Kong to Japan and
concentrated its defensive resources in Singapore."9 7
It is tempting to attribute Hong Kong's remarkable
adaptability, creativity, dynamism, resilience, and rise, to cultural
heritage, locational advantages, physical profile, proximity to
China, and unique relationship with the mainland. The relevance
of such factors cannot be dismissed lightly, but their explanatory
power is inevitably limited, individually and collectively. 9
Ultimately, it cannot be overlooked that Hong Kong experienced
substantial economic progress and smooth adjustment to changes
in its external environment during the three-decade long
estrangement from China. It would have doubtless been a more
challenging proposition in the present set of circumstances, yet this
does not negate the basic argument, which is that the fundamental
driving force has been institutional capital.99
The complexity of this concept leaves room for varying
interpretations, albeit moderately so."o The focus here is primarily
on the institutional architecture, how it is configured, and how the
system functions. Another way of expressing the notion would be
in terms of the structural and operational characteristics of the
governance regime or, more simply, the "rules of the game" and
their organizational underpinnings. In the Hong Kong context,
this has traditionally implied placing overwhelming value on
private initiative, or economic freedom, and going to great lengths
95 Id. at 1.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 2.
98 See MUSHKAT, supra note 55, at 5-7.
99 See id. at 7-10.
oo See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, DEMOCRACIES IN FLUX: THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL
CAPITAL IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2002); LAURA BRUNELL, INSTITUTIONAL CAPITAL:
BUILDING POST-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE (2005); HIROFUMI UZAWA,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL COMMON CAPITAL (2005). See generally ROBERT D.
PUTNAM ET AL., MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CiVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY
(1993) ("[T]he level of economic development has a pronounced effect on political
democracy, even when noneconomic factors are considered.").
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to exercise public sector discipline (strong society-small
government rather than strong society-weak government)."o' For
purposes of capturing the essence of this institutional pattern, the
following time-honored depiction remains useful:
In Hong Kong, economic affairs are conducted in an
environment of virtually unfettered free enterprise. Government
policy has long dictated a virtually hands-off approach toward
the private sector, an approach that seems well suited to Hong
Kong's exposed and dependent economic and political situation.
The philosophy that underlies government in Hong Kong can be
summed up in a few short phrases: law and order, minimum
interference in private affairs, and the creation of an
environment conducive to profitable investment. Regulatory
economic controls are held to a minimum, no restrictions are
placed on the movement of capital, little protection and few
subsidies are given to industry, and the few direct services
provided by government are operated on a commercial basis. 102
This unadulterated institutional variant of neo-liberalism has
not been without its critics. Some have argued that it is not
sufficiently sensitive to market failures in the form of social
inequities, macroeconomic instability, and negative externalities
(notably air and water pollution).0 3 Critics have also contended
that the above portrayal is overly backward-looking, and that it
does not fully correspond with current government policies, which
are indicative of a shift from a "hands-off' posture vis-A-vis the
economy to one of "positive non-interventionism." '" The
emphasis on the positive element in the equation reflects a stance
whereby the government actively endeavors to complement and
enhance the working of market forces, particularly through
investment in physical and social infrastructure. 0 5 Yet, although
101 See MUSHKAT, supra note 55, at 7-10.
102 RABUSHKA, supra note 50, at 44.
103 See MUSHKAT, supra note 55, at 8; Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The
Political Economy of Hong Kong's Transboundary Pollution: The Challenge of Effective
Governance, 9 J. OF INT'L TRADE LAW & POL'Y 175, 175-92 (2010); Miron Mushkat &
Roda Mushkat, Endemic Institutional Fragility in the Face of Dynamic Economic
Integration in Asia: The Case of Transboundary Pollution in Hong Kong in EAST ASIAN
EcoNOMIC INTEGRATION: LAW, TRADE, AND FINANCE 49, 49-80 (Ross P. Buckley,
Richard W. Hu, & Douglas W. Arne eds., Edward Elgar Publishers, 2011).
104 See MUSHKAT, supra note 55, at 8-10; MOLE, supra note 55, at 2-5; Li, supra
note 55, at 17-20.
105 See MUSHKAT, supra note 55, at 8-10; MOLE, supra note 55, at 2-5; Li, supra
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this more assertive strategy amounts to a notable departure from
early colonial era practices, it unquestionably continues to bear the
hallmarks of the neo-liberal institutional blueprint:
One may, of course, quibble and complain that this is a weak
and defective laissez-faire, since it has been contaminated by
some of the concerns of present-day welfare. On the other hand,
it is still as close to the real thing as one can come. If Hong
Kong no longer boasts as much freedom as 18th century
England or the free-wheeling days of 19th century Shanghai, it
is still a far throw from the mixed economies of the West today,
let alone socialist or communist regimes. Let us say it is early
20th century laissez-faire, although its critics might dispute the
fact that it has got so far. In some ways, it is even an improved
form, as compared with the more spontaneous laissez-faire of
earlier times, for the Hong Kong Government is following the
policy consciously and purposefully, taking advantage of the
benefits it does offer . . .. If one wishes to find a well-preserved
and healthy specimen of an otherwise vanishing species, there is
no other place to see and study laissez-faire than Hong Kong. 06
The corollary is that institutional neo-liberalism is a
continuum, rather than the sharp edge of a heavily segmented
conceptual space, and that Hong Kong has by no means exited its
confines by moving away measurably, but not substantially, from
the "pure" post-Industrial Revolution version. Several factors,
including persistent government efforts to develop physical and
social infrastructure conducive to private sector flexibility and
vitality, have contributed directly and indirectly to Hong Kong's
economic strength and versatility, but none have played a role
comparable to that of the neo-liberal institutional design geared
toward maximizing, subject to modest constraints, economic
freedom. '0' More than anything else, this accounts for the
territory's much-vaunted adaptive capacity, or unparalleled ability
to efficiently and fruitfully respond to cyclical and structural
note 55, at 17-20.
106 WORONOFF, supra note 51, at 41. See also A. JOHN YOUNGSON, HONG KONG:
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLICY 115-59 (1982); MA NGOK, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN
HONG KONG: STATE, POLITICAL SOCIETY, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 21-23 (2007); End of an
Experiment, THE ECONOMIST, July 17, 2010, available at http://www.economist.
com/node/16591088.
107 See MUSHKAT, supra note 55, at 7-10; LI, supra note 55, at 9, 17-24.
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opportunities and threats.'"0
III. From a Quintessentially Colonial Outpost to a "Flawed
Democracy"
The regulatory environment is shaped by political, as well as
economic, forces. In the Hong Kong context, these two sides of
the picture show intriguingly divergent patterns. On the one hand,
in the domain of economics, one encounters freedom and
spontaneity, which marginally diminish over time. On the other
hand, in the realm of politics, one observes barriers to entry and
control, which are also slightly relaxed over time. While the two
systems appear to be moving in the same direction, given the
expectation that the political sphere would eventually acquire
some of the "participationist" and "representationist" attributes of
its economic counterpart, no convergence is on the horizon.10 9
The exclusion of the grassroots community was a salient
characteristic of the political process in early-colonial-era Hong
Kong."o The fledgling local civil society was in the initial phases
1o8 See MUSHKAT, supra note 55, at 7-10; LI, supra note 55, at 9, 17-24.
109 See SONNY SHIU-HING Lo, THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN HONG KONG
(1997); ALVIN Y. So, HONG KONG's EMBATTLED DEMOCRACY: A SOCIETAL ANALYSIS
(1999); NICHOLAS THOMAS, DEMOCRACY DENIED: IDENTITY, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND
ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG (1999); SONNY SHIU-HING Lo, GOVERNING HONG
KONG: LEGITIMACY, COMMUNICATION, AND POLITICAL DECAY (2001) [hereinafter Lo,
LEGITIMACY, COMMUNICATION, AND POLITICAL DECAY]; MING SING, HONG KONG'S
TORTUOUS DEMOCRATIZATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2004); Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo,
The Mainlandization and Recolonization of Hong Kong: The Triumph of Convergence
over Divergence with Mainland China in THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION IN ITS FIRST DECADE 179-231 (2007) [hereinafter Lo, The Triumph of
Convergence over Divergence with Mainland China]; Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, The
Political Culture of Hong Kong and Mainland China: Democratization, Patrimonialism,
and Pluralism in the 2007 Chief Executive Election, 29 ASIA PAC. J. PUB. ADMIN. 101,
101-28 (June 2007) [hereinafter Lo, Democratization, Patrimonialismn, and Pluralism];
Benny Y.T. Tai, Basic Law, Basic Politics: The Constitutional Game of Hong Kong 37
H.K. L.J. 503, 503-78 (2007); SONNY SHIU-HING Lo, THE DYNAMICS OF BEIJING-HONG
KONG RELATIONS: A MODEL FOR TAIWAN? (Hong Kong University Press, 2008)
[hereinafter LO, A MODEL FOR TAIWAN?]; SUZANNE PEPPER, KEEPING DEMOCRACY AT
BAY: HONG KONG AND THE CHALLENGE OF CHINESE POLITICAL REFORM (2008); SONNY
SHIU-HING Lo, COMPETING CHINESE POLITICAL VISIONS: HONG KONG VS. BEIJING ON
DEMOCRACY (2010) [hereinafter Lo, HONG KONG VS. BEIJING ON DEMOCRACY]. See
generally Mushkat, An Analytical Overview, supra note 24 (discussing Hong Kong's
economic institutions as being structured along distinctly libertarian lines, whereas, the
political realm involves a multitude of barriers).
no See Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Political Economy of Loose
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of development firmly split along racial lines, with top British civil
servants and prominent British merchants occupying the upper
layers of the socio-bureaucratic pyramid, and Chinese merchants
and workers the lower ones."' Robust economic expansion and
tactically astute deployment of newly gained wealth to effectively
promote group-specific interests enabled the fragmented Chinese
merchant network to attain sufficient cohesion and strength to
convert itself into a credible institutional entity that had to be
reckoned with."2
The racial distinction persisted, but its practical relevance
gradually dwindled as common class interests came to loom larger
in the decision calculus."' The semi-organized Chinese merchant
network was thus absorbed into the policy establishment, which
continued to be spearheaded by the colonial civil service elite."4
Co-optation did not amount to full-fledged integration, but it
allowed the group and its key members to play a meaningful,
albeit not vital, role in strategy formulation in a number of areas
essential to Hong Kong's prosperity and stability. "' Chinese
workers, on the other hand, continued to be politically
marginalized."'
This configuration did not undergo a fundamental adjustment
even following the outbreak of the Korean War, which resulted in
the imposition of a UN embargo on China, and the influx of
refugees from the mainland in the wake of the intensification of
communization, notably the calamitous Great Leap Forward and
Cultural Revolution. "' Hong Kong's manufacturing base
expanded dramatically during this period and so did the pool of
workers in that sector, who nevertheless did not transform
themselves into an industrial proletariat and refrained from flexing
their political muscle. "' Arrivals from China also included
Regulation: Modernity Meets Tradition in Hong Kong, 7 INT'L J. REG. & GOVERNANCE
101, 101-45 (2007).
III See id. at 127.
112 See id. at 127-28.
113 See id. at 128.
114 See id.
115 See id.
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successful businesspeople and middle class professionals, although
on a more modest scale, but they too chose not to exercise their
collective voice.'19
The political reticence exhibited by this new, but sizeable,
segment of the population has been attributed to a refugee
mentality, stemming from an "administratively precarious position
in an alien and unfamiliar institutional setting," 12 0 commonly
associated with a "do-not-rock-the-boat mentality." 121 Long
exposure to authoritarian practices in the mainland is believed to
have reinforced this attitudinal disposition, "which carried the
hallmarks of a familistic and parochial orientation, not conducive
to the formation of class consciousness and identity." 2 2 Another,
more palpable element in the equation, is thought to have been the
shrinking of old-style, capital-intensive industries (e.g., docking
and shipbuilding, known for breeding class solidarity), and the
emergence of new ones, dominated by small and medium-size
enterprises (SMEs). 123 Such an organizational milieu typically
features high labor mobility, which fosters a sense of
individualism, rather than esprit de corps.124
The structural transformation ushered in by the opening up of
China in the late 1970s had an inevitable impact on Hong Kong's
polarized, essentially two-tier social pyramid, largely consisting of
a cohesive ruling elite and an amorphous laboring class. 125
Another, potentially significant layer materialized, "encompassing
administrators, managers, representatives of the learned
professions, and other white-collar workers."l26 Its members were
mostly locally born and bred, not heavily burdened with the harsh
refugee experience and fragile mentality of the waves of mainland





122 See Mushkat & Mushkat, supra note I10, at 128.
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 See id. at 128-29.
126 Id. at 129.
127 See id.
128 See Mushkat & Mushkat, supra note I10, at 129.
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The hesitant quest by the rising middle class to realize its
decision rights has been ascribed to Hong Kong's "minimally
integrated socio-political system, resting on two unconnected
pillars-an autonomous bureaucratic polity and an atomistic
Chinese society." 129 The first of these two elements was
historically "composed of the civil service or its top expatriate
echelon, and its socio-economically privileged local partners,
owing to the former their political status."',o This narrow coalition
functioned as "an exclusive, inward-looking, and tightly controlled
institution not prone to welcoming new [groups] and their
ideas."' 3 ' At the other side of the social divide, "[t]he Chinese
community ... reflecting its mainland origins (a legacy of
malevolent government) and local tradition of self-reliance also
displayed virtually no interest in matters other than those
concerning the family (exhibiting utilitarianistic
familism/utilitarian familism)".13 2
Hong Kong's minimally integrated socio-political system has
evolved considerably in the past three decades.3 3 Partly due to
top-down British pressures during the pre-1997 negotiations with
China regarding the future of the territory,13 4 and, to some extent,
on account of persistent, bottom-up demands emanating from the
grassroots community, notably the increasingly assertive middle
class,' the channels of political participation have been readjusted
to provide for more meaningful input from outside the entrenched,
bureaucratic-business establishment (although, at the same time,
an opposite trend has been observed toward the re-
bureaucratization of politics), and unorganized political activity
has gained significant momentum.' 36 Formal political institutions,






134 See Roda Mushkat, The Dynamics of International Legal Regime Fornation:
The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong Revisited, 22 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 1119, 1128-32 (2011).
135 See generally SING, supra note 109, at 107-10, 116-17, 137-39 (using a
graphical depiction to display the interaction of bottom-up demands with top-down
British pressures).
136 See Mushkat & Mushkat, supra note I10, at 129.
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society has substantially expanded its sphere of influence.'
Nevertheless, Hong Kong has barely advanced to a level
equated by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) with a "flawed
democracy," having until recently been less favorably categorized
as a "hybrid regime."'3 As matters stand, the territory's political
system is heavily skewed in favor of the executive branch of
government, which is significantly controlled, perhaps even
dominated, by its head, the chief executive (CE).' 3 ' The latter is
chosen by a 1200-member Election Committee (EC) rather than a
popular vote.14 0 The EC is also not a product of the expressed will
of the people.141 Rather, it represents four broad-based sectors
(industrial, commercial, and financial; the professions; labor,
grassroots, religious, and related; and political), over many of
which China, or its ruling party, exerts considerable influence.' 4 2
The CE and the supporting administrative machinery are the
source of virtually all government strategic initiatives. 143
Generally, no approval by the Legislative Council (LegCo) is
required, unless policies entail changes to existing laws or new
financial measures.144 The CE is independent of LegCo, as the
method of election and reality that the latter has no power to pass a
vote of no confidence that would lead to the office-holder's
dismissal, 145 illustrates. The option of impeachment is
theoretically available, but it poses serious practical difficulties.146
The CE initiates legislation, and government bills enjoy priority
over those from other sources.14'7 All bills adopted by LegCo must
137 See id.
138 See Ernest Kao, Hong Kong Upgrades to 'Flawed Democracy' Status on
Economist Index, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 21, 2013, available at
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/ 195234/hong-kong-upgrades-flawed-
democracy-status-economist-index.
139 See MA, supra note 106, at 58-59.
140 See id. at 58; Facts and Figures, 2011 ELECTION COMMITTEE SUBSECTOR
ELECTIONS (Oct. 31, 2011), www.elections.gov.hk/ecss20 1/eng//figures.html.
141 See MA, supra note 106, at 76-77.
142 See id.
143 See id. at 58.
144 See id.
145 See YASH GHAI, HONG KONG'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION
OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC LAW 285 (1999).
146 See id. at 285.
147 See MA, supra note 106, at 58.
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have the CE's signature to become effective laws. 148 The CE has
extensive appointment powers, which extend to the judiciary.14 9
For the most part, these are not subject to legislative or judicial
scrutiny. so
It should be added that the CE might return to LegCo, for
further consideration, a bill he/she deems incompatible with the
overall interests of Hong Kong."' Moreover, the CE may dissolve
LegCo if he/she does not wish to pass the new version of the bill,
or if LegCo rejects the annual budget or any bill considered
essential by the administration.152 LegCo itself cannot be said to
constitute a mirror of society because a large number of its
members are indirectly, rather than directly, elected. '3 To
complicate matters further, it is a highly fragmented institution.15 4
Beijing's, or the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP), large shadow
hangs over the entire executive and legislative policy-making
apparatus.'ss
The responsibility for Hong Kong's retarded democratic
development has been placed on Beijing's intrusive shoulders."'
Social scientists have argued that the "CCP's obstructive policy
square[s] well with its interests."' China is believed to have
adopted a "third-way" type of a reform strategy that involves
economic but not political liberalization. 1' Its leaders thus
earnestly pursue modernization while persistently endeavoring to
maintain their tight grip on power. 5 9 A freewheeling Hong Kong
economy dovetails with Chinese leaders' overarching goals, but a
148 See id. at 58.
149 See id.
Iso See id. at 58-59.
is See id. at 59.
152 See id.
153 See MA, supra note 106, at 100-02.
154 See id. at 104-07, 119-22.
155 See id. at 34-36; Lo, LEGITIMACY, COMMUNICATION, AND POLITICAL DECAY,
supra note 109; Lo, Triumph of Convergence over Divergence with Mainland China,
supra note 109; Lo, Democratization, Patrimonialism, and Pluralism, supra note 109;
Lo, A MODEL FOR TAIWAN?, Supra note 109; Lo, HONG KONG VS. BEIJING ON
DEMOCRACY, supra note 109.
156 See SING, supra note 109, at 204-07.
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genuinely democratic one presents the risk of dangerous cross-
border political contamination and rapid erosion of top-down
controls.160
Indeed, some social scientists have contended that the CCP has
methodically been engaged in a policy of "mainlandization" in
Hong Kong, gradually aiming to engineer a convergence, or at
least a higher degree of convergence, between the politico-legal
institutional infrastructure in the mainland and that in the
increasingly politically assertive capitalist enclave. 161 In the
process, it has managed to co-opt sizeable segments of the Hong
Kong socio-economic establishment, intensifying the conflict
between proponents of "top-down" and "bottom-up" models of
governance in the territory.162
The strategy of mainlandization is thought to have been not
without success.'16  The evidence offered includes manifestations
of political decay in various forms.'" Specifically, it has been
noted that the post-1997,
HKSAR is characterized by a more personal style of
governance; a chaotic implementation of public policies; an
increasingly politicized judiciary whose decisions have been ...
challenged by Beijing and its supporters in Hong Kong;
endangered civil liberties including academic freedom; an
16o See id.
161 See Lo, The Triumph of Convergence over Divergence with Mainland China,
supra note 109; Lo, Democratization, Patrimonialism, and Pluralism, supra note 109;
LO, A MODEL FOR TAIWAN?, supra note 109; Lo, HONG KONG VS. BEIJING ON
DEMOCRACY, supra note 109. See generally Lo, LEGITIMACY, COMMUNICATION, AND
POLITICAL DECAY, supra note 109 (detailing the political and economic changes in Hong
Kong over several years).
162 See Lo, A MODEL FOR TAIWAN?, supra note 109, at 29-34; Lo, HONG KONG VS.
BEIJING ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 109, at 202-27.
163 See Lo, HONG KONG VS. BEIJING ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 109, at 202-27
(describing Hong Kong democrats as "bold idealists" who will not succumb easily); Lo,
LEGITIMACY, COMMUNICATION, AND POLITICAL DECAY, supra note 109 (explaining that
pro-democracy activists face constant frustration and articulating prospects of political
development and decay); Lo, The Triumph of Convergence over Divergence with
Mainland China, supra note 109; Lo, Democratization, Patrimonialism, and Pluralism,
supra note 109 (asserting that the process is slow because the "Beijing and the HKSAR
government maintain that democratization has to proceed in a gradual and orderly
manner"). See generally Lo, A MODEL FOR TAIWAN?, supra note 109 (arguing that
governance of the HKSAR was "superficially 'successful' but substantially turbulent").
164 See Lo, LEGITIMACY, COMMUNICATION, AND POLITICAL DECAY, supra note 109,
atl -28.
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amalgamation of political labelling and mobilization; a failure of
political institutions to absorb public pressure and demands; and
a governmental insensitivity to public opinion.165
The notion of mainlandization does not take into account
trends across the border that may mitigate its impact. After all, the
political scene in China is not entirely static because, according to
other social scientists, the country is undergoing "Hong
Kongization" or "Westernization."16 ' The two perspectives are not
easy to reconcile. However, it may realistically be suggested that
mainlandization poses a short-term or medium-term challenge,
while Hong Kongization or Westernization is characterized by
complex evolutionary dynamics whose cumulative and uneven
effects may not be fully and productively observed for years to
come. 167
A number of features of the partially mainlandized Hong Kong
political system have been singled out as fundamentally
problematic. 16' These include soft authoritarianism; "' self-
censorship, political correctness, and threats to press freedom; o
strong promotion of nationalist sentiment; 1' disarticulation, or
segmentation of the policy machinery; 172 and low government
legitimacy.17 There may also have been a corrosion of the rule of
165 Id. at 13.
166 See generally RANDALL P. PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE
OF LAW (2002) (emphasizing the boom of law in China); RANDALL P. PEERENBOOM,
CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE WEST OR MODEL FOR THE REST (2007) (deeming one
China as "the envy of developing countries" based on the millions of people rising out of
poverty, development of a legal system, and increasing international influence); Peter
T.Y. Cheung, Who Is Influencing Whom? Exploring the Influence of Hong Kong on
Politics and Governance in China 51 ASIAN SURv. 713, 713-38 (2011) (exploring "how
Hong Kong has influenced Chinese politics and governance in the constitutional,
political, ideational, and intergovernmental dimensions").
167 See Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, Economic Growth, Democracy, the Rule
ofLaw, & China's Future 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 229, 243-47 (2005).
168 See Lam Wai-Man, Political Context, in CONTEMPORARY HONG KONG POLITICS:
GOVERNANCE IN THE POST-1997 ERA 1-17 (2007); IAN SCOTT, THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN
HONG KONG 295-97 (2010).
169 See Lam, supra note 168, at 11.
170 See id.
171 See id. at 11-12.
172 See Scorr, supra note 168, at 295-96.
173 See id. at 296-97.
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law, although only very modest in nature.174 These symptoms of
institutional dislocation have adversely affected the overall
effectiveness of the governance regime, detracting from "State
capacity" in key areas and undermining State-society relations. 7 1
There are countervailing forces at work. Technically speaking,
civil service (as distinct from State service) capacity remains
substantial. 7' By the same token, Hong Kong does not lack
reliable, stability-enhancing institutional mechanisms. Most
crucial is its robust rule of law system, including a largely
autonomous judiciary; 177 combative and not yet materially
impeded media; 178 lively and resilient civil society; '71 and
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)."' Also of
considerable importance are the Code on Access to Information;'
Privacy Commissioner; 182 Equal Opportunities Commission
(EOC); ' LegCo redress channel; 184 Ombusdman; ' Complaints
Against the Police Office (CAPO); 186 departmental complaint-
handling units; 187 administrative tribunals and Administrative
Appeals Board;' and Audit Commission.' The existence of
such institutional checks and balances, notwithstanding the
partially mainlandized Hong Kong political system, due to its
notable frailties, may reasonably be portrayed as "challenged,"
which has inevitable implications for the design and assessment of
policy control instruments.
174 See MA, supra note 106, at 79-82.
175 See id. at 199-219.
176 See JOHN P. BURNs, GOVERNMENT CAPACITY & THE HONG KONG CIVIL SERVICE
348-51 (2004).
177 See Lam, supra note 168, at 10-11; MA, supra note 106, at 83-85.
178 See Lam, supra note 168, at I1; MA, supra note 106, at 164-79.
179 See Lam, supra note 168, at 12-13; MA, supra note 106, at 199-219.
18o See SCOTT, supra note 168, at 267-70.
18, See id. at 260-61.
182 See id. at 261.
183 See id. at 261-64; MA, supra note 106, at 87-89.
184 See SCOTT, supra note 168, at 264-67.
s85 See id. at 271-78; MA, supra note 107, at 86-87.
186 See SCOTT, supra note 168, at 278-84.
187 See id. at 284-85.
188 See id. at 285-88.
189 See MA, supra note 106, at 90.
319
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
IV. Key Characteristics of the Micro-Level Regulatory
Environment
As indicated, Hong Kong's highly productive and very telling
economic experience has not been accorded the close attention it
merits. This has been attributed to the territory's modest physical
size and the atypical nature of its regime which, although
extraordinarily successful, has fundamentally diverged from the
perhaps more intellectually intriguing developmental state model
commonly embraced elsewhere in Asia.' 90 However, there is in
fact a modest but selectively informative literature on the Hong
Kong economy. Most of it is macro oriented, highlighting the
overall structure, with special emphasis on the non-discretionary
monetary policy and the consistently rule-based-and thus, for all
intents and purposes, also non-discretionary-fiscal counterpart. 9'
Given the exceptional openness of the system, foreign trade, and
the related subject of regional integration, is also generally treated
in considerable detail and in a systematic fashion.192
The micro side, which is inherently more fragmented and
opaque, has been less extensively explored. No regime-wide
description and evaluation is available. A number of narrowly
focused studies have been undertaken, without being meaningfully
synthesized.'93 A degree of caution thus needs to be exercised in
drawing broad inferences on that basis. With this caveat in mind,
the insights produced may be tentatively weaved together to yield
a picture that captures salient features of the system to a sufficient
extent to render it relevant and usable across the entire regulatory
spectrum.
It should be noted at the outset that the Hong Kong
government has long been engaged, in one form or another, in the
control of private sector activities-albeit, more often than not, on
a limited scale and indirectly rather than directly-and that its
190 See LI, supra note 55, at 135-252; see also ALVIN RABUSHKA, VALUE FOR
MONEY: THE HONG KONG BUDGETARY PROCESS (1976); GAVIN PEEBLES, HONG KONG'S
ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTORY MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 139-73 (1988).
19, See LI, supra note 55, at 135-252; see also ALVIN RABUSHKA, VALUE FOR
MONEY: THE HONG KONG BUDGETARY PROCESS (1976); GAVIN PEEBLES, HONG KONG'S
ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTORY MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 139-73 (1988).
192 See LI, supra note 55, at 299-428; see also PEEBLES, supra note 191, at 174-214;
YOUNGSON, supra note 106, at 92-114.
193 See, e.g., Mole (ed.), supra note 45; Lethbridge and Ng eds., supra note 45.
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involvement, even when marked by restraint, has at times
provoked controversy. A telling case in point is the issue of
whether the territory suffered from "excessive" competition in the
banking industry, and whether the measures gradually introduced
at the behest of incumbents to curtail oversupply were
appropriate.' 4 Despite two serious financial crises experienced
during that period, a subsequent, elaborate empirical examination
of the data revealed that both the diagnosis and remedies were
flawed. 195 This suggests that an inadequately insulated and
technically ill-equipped light-touch regulatory regime is by no
means immune to exogenous pressures, misleading signals, and
temptation to succumb to pro-status quo impulses.
This example is relevant because it refers to a policy domain
where Hong Kong, a leading financial center, has not stood still,
but has in fact been willing to establish rather elaborate micro-
level mechanisms to control private sector behavior. 196 The
evolution of the territory's financial regulatory regime, with the
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) and Securities and
Futures Commission (SFC) as its two institutional pillars, has been
a piecemeal and reactive process, rather than one characterized by
decisiveness and foresight.197 The current configuration is largely
a product of crises and responses thereto, as well as British and
international (via standard setting) influences.198 Nevertheless,
whatever the origins, the corollary is that there are strategic sectors
where the regulatory edifice qualifies as substantial, and despite
the breadth and depth of system, questions arise regarding its
effectiveness, or less controversially, the optimal way forward.'99
194 See e.g., Catherine R. Schenk, The Origins ofAnti-Competitive Regulation: Was
Hong Kong "Over-Banked" in the 1960s (H.K. Institute for Monetary Research,
Working Paper No. 9, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid+1008230 (last visited Aug. 20, 2014) (concluding that anti-competitive
regulation was not enacted because of excessive competition, but in an effort to increase
supervision of banks that had threatened liquidity and solvency).
195 See id.
196 See BERRY F.C. HSU ET AL., FINANCIAL MARKETS IN HONG KONG: LAW AND
PRACTICE (2006); Douglas W. Amer, Berry F.C. Hsu, & Antonio M. Da Rosa, Financial
Regulation in Hong Kong: Time for a Change, 5 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1-47 (2010)
(describing a three tier system to financial regulation).
197 See Hsu, supra note 196; Amer et al., supra note 196.
198 See Hsu, supra note 196; Amer et al., supra note 196.
199 See Hsu, supra note 196; Amer et al., supra note 196.
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This is not an isolated example. In fact, the issue of business
competition and its regulation has long loomed on Hong Kong's
policy agenda, both in the conceptual and practical sense of the
term, albeit the former element may have overshadowed the
latter. 200 The territory's transformation, from an international
manufacturing center to a service-oriented one, has heightened the
focus and has reinforced the perception that appropriate
government intervention could strengthen, rather than undermine,
the sturdy but not unbreakable foundations of a quintessentially
market-based economy.2 0 Prior to that pivotal structural change,
Hong Kong's manufacturing firms, mostly SMEs, operated in
fiercely competitive segments of the global economy and were
highly motivated to maximize efficiency.-02 This, in turn, exerted
downward pressure on costs and prices and encouraged the pursuit
of innovation and quality, a mix conducive to the realization of
consumer welfare.20 3
That has not been the case, invariably and sufficiently, in the
service industries, some of which preceded the northward
migration of their manufacturing counterparts, but a move toward
efficiency in service industries has subsequently gained
momentum. In such industries, barriers to competition are
common, even in a liberal and open economic environment as seen
in Hong Kong. 204 Typically, these barriers assume the form of
institutional, technological, and strategic hurdles that enhance
firms' market power. 20" This pattern is normally attributable to
regulatory initiative (institutional dimension; e.g., licensing
requirements and granting of limited franchises), nature of the
production process (technological dimension; e.g., learning-by-
doing and economies of scale and scope), and corporate tactics to
dampen competition (strategic dimension; e.g., control of key
inputs and preemptive capacity expansion).20 6
Not all the service industries that have flourished in Hong
200 See generally LEONARD K. CHENG & CHANQI WU, COMPETITION POLICY AND THE
REGULATION OF BUSINESS (1998) (examining the shift in the Hong Kong economy).
201 See id. at 1-2.
202 See id. at 1.
203 See id.
204 See id.
205 See Cheng & Wu, supra note 200, at 1-2.
206 See id. at 5-7.
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Kong's deindustrialized economy have necessarily been
characterized by a significant concentration of market power and a
subsequent attempt to curtail this via regulation.207 Some have
been deemed to be essentially competitive and have thus been set
apart from those lacking such features. 208 However, both
categories have been examined in considerable detail by
economists concerned with the efficiency of the institutional
infrastructure of the Hong Kong global metropolis. 209 In the first
case, the emphasis has been on the degree of competition, as
distinct from its absence or presence; impediments to progress;
and possible government measures to address manifestations of
market failure.210 In the second case, the focus has been on the
effectiveness of regulatory responses; potential for a superior
policy design; and the scope for instilling, whether through public
or private channels, greater competitive spirit into the sprawling
207 See id. at 3.
208 See id.
209 See id.; MILTON MUELLER, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN HONG
KONG: THE CASE FOR LIBERALIZATION (1991); see e.g., LEONARD K. CHENG & RICHARD
Y.C. WONG, PORT FACILITIES & CONTAINER HANDLING SERVICES (1997) (stating that
Hong Kong port facilities and handling services have been successful over the last
decade, but likely will face challenges due to the changing economic climate); PUN-LEE
LAM, COMPETITION IN ENERGY (1997) (examining increased competition in the energy
and hesitance to reform); PUN-LEE LAM & SYLVIA CHAN, COMPETITION IN HONG KONG'S
GAS INDUSTRY (2000) (suggesting ten ways to enhance competition in the gas industry in
Hong Kong); Changqi Wu & Leonard K. Cheng, Hong Kong's Business Regulation in
Transition, in DEREGULATION & INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 157-85
(2000) (explaining regulation of monopolies in the past and the current landscape
regarding "electricity telecommunications services, public transport, and airport
services"); Patrick Xavier & Xu Yan, Telecommunications Regulations in Hong Kong 4
INFO 12-25 (2002) (concluding that Hong Kong's regulatory legislation is a good start to
reform in a pro-competitive way); Thomas Cheng, A Tale of Two Competition Regimes
The Telecom Sector Competition Regulation in Hong Kong & Singapore 30 WORLD
COMPETITION 501, 501-26 (2007) (comparing the economies of Hong Kong and
Singapore based on their status as "two of the most successful and competitive
economies in East Asia"); Richard W.S. Wu & Grace L.K. Leung, Competition
Regulation in the Hong Kong Telecommunications Sector-Challenges & Reforms 32
TELECOMMS. POL'Y 652, 652-61 (2008) (arguing adoption of legislation is insufficient to
meet the challenges of "cross-sector" bundling activities that are needed to influence a
growing China); Chun-Yu Ho, Deregulation, Competition, & Consumer Welfare:
Evidence from Hong Kong 37 J. OF REG. ECON. 70, 70-97 (2010) (determining that
competition and customer welfare in the banking industry are better when there is little
regulation).
210 See CHENG & Wu, supra note 200, at 3.
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service sector.2 11
The academic research conducted in this area has been
undertaken within a rigorous micro-economic framework-
derived from a number of analytical perspectives, traditional,
Schumpeterian, and the theory of constable markets. 212 A
substantial amount of empirical data has also been generated
regarding industry structure, performance, and regulation in a wide
range of sectors such as banking, insurance, legal services,
residential properties, supermarkets, electricity and gas supply,
telecommunications services, public transport, and transport
infrastructure services. 213 In addition, the schemes of control
relied upon by the government have been subjected to close
scrutiny, conceptually and factually.2 14
There is, consequently, adequate evidence to suggest that
departures from the perfect competition model are not a rare
occurrence in post-industrial Hong Kong and are not confined to
sectors dominated by natural monopolies. Although scholarly
consensus has not fully crystallized regarding these matters,
attention has systematically been drawn to the prevalence of
horizontal and vertical agreements between firms, abuse of
dominant corporate position, complex monopolies, and mergers
and acquisitions-practices that may prevent, restrict, or distort
competitive behavior in the marketplace. 21 5 By the same token, it
has been analytically and empirically demonstrated that public
controls have not been implemented in a holistic fashion, resulting
in potential gaps and inconsistencies in the regulatory fagade.2 16
While economists seldom venture deep into political territory,
two issues raised in this context should be highlighted. First, it has
been argued that caution should be exercised in unequivocally
211 See id.
212 See id. at 9-13.
213 See id. at 23-212; PuN-LEE LAM, THE SCHEME OF CONTROL ON ELECTRICITY
COMPANIES (1996). See also MUELLER, supra note 209; CHENG & WONG, supra note
209; LAM, supra note 209; LAM & CHAN, supra note 209; Wu & Cheng, supra note 209;
Cheng, supra note 209; Xavier, supra note 209; Wu & Leung, supra note 209; Ho, supra
note 209.
214 See CHENG & WU, supra note 200, at 213-22; Wu & Cheng, supra note 209, at
160-72.
215 See CHENG & WU, supra note 200, at 228-32.
216 See id. at 213-253; Wu and Cheng, supra note 209, at 160-72. See also LAM,
supra note 213.
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acknowledging the need for government response to market failure
and unreservedly advocating active intervention as an appealing
option.217 The reason lies in the fact that "officials in charge of
economic policy making [may lack] perfect knowledge and
foresight, and [may not] be completely disinterested." 2 18 After all,
"[a]s the experience of business regulation in Hong Kong and
other economies has revealed, government regulators face serious
principal-agent problems with serious information asymmetry."2 19
The corollary is that "[i]t is very probable that regulators are
'captured' by the regulated." 220
Second, the delicate Hong Kong-China relationship has
inevitably entered into an otherwise predominantly technical
discourse. 221 Specifically, the question has surfaced whether
mainland State-owned-enterprises (SOEs) might be inclined to
take advantage of their official or semi-official status in order to
unfairly enhance their competitive position in post-1997 Hong
Kong.222 The problem has partly been framed in legal terms,
reflecting a set of circumstances whereby "the exercise of such
influences for the benefit of companies, rather for the individuals
themselves, does not constitute a violation of Hong Kong's anti-
corruption laws."223 This is a challenge for which there are no
readily available legislative precedents from other jurisdictions,
but one where it might be imprudent to relegate to the policy
periphery since "Hong Kong is unique in the world because it is
part of China's 'one country-two systems' arrangement." 2 24
These two noteworthy issues have not been thoroughly
explored due to the tendency of economists, lawyers, and political
scientists in the territory to follow their own disciplinary path
without seeking meaningful convergence. However, there are a
number of detailed case studies that lend support to the notion of
regulatory cartelization and capture, exemplified by both policies
designed to satisfy special business or professional interests




221 See id. at 232-33.
222 See id.
223 CHENG & WU, supra note 200, at 232.
224 Id. at 233.
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(cartelization) and rule application that is indicative of bias toward
such interests (capture). 2 5 The complex and controversial subject
of mainlandization has primarily been examined in relation to
political development, but the economic side of the phenomenon
has also been selectively highlighted.22 6
With respect to the latter-in addition to broad-based,
empirically grounded academic insights-concrete examples are
periodically furnished in support of the (partial) economic
mainlandization thesis. One that has attracted considerable
attention involved China Light and Power (CLP), one of Hong
Kong's two principal electricity utilities.2 27 Rather than building a
shipping terminal for liquefied natural gas in the territory, the
company was pressured by the government to enter into a long-
term contractual arrangement with PetroChina, the mainland's
largest energy producer and distributor. 2 28 The ultimate loser has
been the Hong Kong consumer, because the deal was struck at
inflated prices, relatively speaking.229
Another pertinent example is that of China Mobile, the
mainland's (and the world's) largest provider of
telecommunications services. In this case, the Hong Kong
government bent its own rules in order to accommodate a powerful
corporate entity, which is an integral part of the Chinese politico-
economic establishment. 231 The company conveniently preferred
to rely on its own spectrum, rather than rent it from an existing
225 See Mushkat & Mushkat, supra note 110; Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The
Political Economy of Hong Kong's 'Open Skies' Legal Regime: An Empirical and
Theoretical Exploration, 10 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 381, 381-438.
226 See Lo, GOVERNING HONG KONG: LEGITIMACY, COMMUNICATION, AND POLITICAL
DECAY, supra note 109, at 2, 11-14, 67-78; Alva Butcher, Paul Y. Huo, & John K.C.
Wei, Money and Politics: A Study of Red-Chip Stocks in Hong Kong, available at
repository.ust.hk/dspace/handle/1783.1/2167 (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
227 See Two Systems, One Energy Price: Hong Kong Sells Consumers to Benefit a
Chinese Company, WALL ST. J., available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SBl0001424127887324624404578255580435887020 (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
228 See id
229 See id.
230 See Hong Kong's Dropped Call: The City's Government is Doing Favors for
Mainland Firms, WALL ST. J., available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887324600704578402030650436280.html?mod=WSJASIA
hppsections opinion (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
231 See id.
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license holder.2 3 2 The Hong Kong authorities thus obligingly
proceeded, contrary to the established practice, to reclaim a
substantial portion of the spectrum controlled by the existing
license holders and put it up for auction again.23 ' The maneuver
did not result in an increased supply of spectrum, but rather
redistribution, once more to the detriment of the local consumer,
by potentially leading to rising costs and deteriorating quality of
234service.
Cartelization and capture, even if not pervasive, may combine
with imperfect knowledge and foresight to produce a rather erratic
regulatory regime, bearing the hallmarks of the "garbage can"
model of organizational decision making. 235 There is some
evidence that this pattern may be observed in the broadcasting
industry, where Hong Kong authorities may have adopted fuzzy
rules for controlling uncompetitive practices and may have applied
them haphazardly. 2 36 It is reasonable to assume that economic
mainlandization may exacerbate bureaucratic strains by subjecting
the government to additional pressures and thus increase the
propensity to act in a sub-optimal fashion.
Two explanatory perspectives may be offered to
complement-rather than supplant-the cartelization and capture
theoretical propositions. First, it may be argued that Hong Kong's
policy architects and managers may have a general pro-business
bias, reflecting a laisser-faire ethos and tradition, and they do not
consistently and flagrantly discriminate against or favor one
segment of industry or another. This is a view that has
considerable support among economists, even those of a critical
disposition. 237 For instance, "[i]t has been broadly accepted by




235 See MICHAEL HOWLETT, M. RAMESH, & ANTHONY PERL, STUDYING PUBLIC
POLICY: POLICY CYCLES AND POLICY SUBSYSTEMS, 151-53 (3d ed., Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009); PAUL CAIRNEY, UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC POLICY: THEORIES AND
ISSUES, 232-33 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
236 See Thomas Cheng, Competition Law Enforcement in the Television Sector in
Hong Kong: Past Cases and Recent Controversies, 33 WORLD COMPETITION 317-43
(2010).
237 See MOLE, supra note 55, at 4.
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Kong." 238
A second potentially relevant explanatory scheme focuses on
the style or standard operating procedure of key players in the
policy formulation and implementation process. 239 In some
institutional milieus, such actors tend to proceed incrementally and
endeavor to forge a consensus with external stakeholders or
significant interest groups. 24 0 Elsewhere, they may be inclined to
move more decisively and impose rather than consult. 241 Hong
Kong appears to fall into the former category, which may account
for a degree of regulatory opaqueness and reticence with respect to
242departures from perfect competition. Of course, this is not
inconsistent with the assertion that the business sector, and certain
segments thereof, may loom larger on the government's strategic
horizon than other pivotal groups (e.g., the consumer).243
Thus, a number of pertinent observations are in order. First,
Hong Kong's comparatively and productively unshackled
economy is not entirely devoid of government intervention-at the
micro as well as the macro level. Second, policy responses to
'excessive' concentration of market power-notably, but no longer
exclusively, in the case of natural monopolies-are not necessarily
a new and aberrant phenomenon. Third, prior to the recent
introduction of a competition law, the approach to the subject had
been characterized as ideational ambivalence, piecemeal
engineering, and structural fragmentation. Fourth, the regulation
of business competition cannot be conceptualized merely in terms
of the degree of market failure, analytical grounds for government
intervention, and efficiency consequences of the remedial
measures contemplated or embraced.
The intellectual and practical agenda has a salient behavioral
element, which falls within the ambit of law and economics
(distinct from the economic analysis of law) and political
238 See id.
239 See POLIcY STYLES IN WESTERN EUROPE (Jeremy Richardson ed., London: Allen
and Unwin, 1982).
240 See id. at 10-14.
241 See id.
242 See generally Mushkat & Mushkat, supra note I10 (explaining that as a result of
historical events, Hong Kong's ability to progress has been stymied by an abundance of
caution and incrementalism).
243 See MOLE, supra note 55, at 4.
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economy. Issues such as the effectiveness of the regulatory
process-narrowly equated with imperfect knowledge and
foresight, but possessing additional dimensions--cartelization,
capture, economic mainlandization, overall government-business
relationships, and policy style should arguably not be overlooked
in assessing the quantum leap that Hong Kong has apparently
taken in dealing with possible challenges to its competitive order.
V. From a Loose Patchwork to an Elaborate Control System
A. Historical Backdrop
The evidence presented suggests that, without disputing Hong
Kong's status as a bastion of free enterprise, it is legitimate to
selectively qualify this assessment, because the local government
has not consistently and wholly refrained from macro and micro
level intervention in the essentially untrammeled and widely open
colonial-era and post-1997 market economy.244 Moreover, on the
micro front, the questions of industry structure, strategy, and
performance have long been featured, even if not on a large scale,
in public policy discourse. 245 . Importantly, sector-specific
regulation of competition, of the conventional variety, has steadily
been practiced not merely in the traditional utilities space, but also
in industries such as broadcasting and telecommunications.2 46
Indeed, the issue of the desirability and potential form of a
comprehensive regime to address excessive market power has
periodically surfaced. 247 A key milestone in the evolution of
relevant ideas and institutions was the establishment of the Hong
Kong Consumer Council (HKCC) in 1974.248 While it was not
granted the authority to carry out investigations and employ
sanctions, its responsibilities included the right to collect, obtain,
and provide information regarding goods, services, and
irremovable property.249 In 1992, nearly two decades after the
HKCC's founding, the government requested a detailed
244 See supra notes 109-243, and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 109-243, and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 230-236, and accompanying text.
247 See Tsang Shu-Ki, Competition Regulation in Hong Kong, SKTSANG,
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examination of competitive patterns across the entire industrial
spectrum.250
The HKCC's study extended over a four-year period. 25 1 From
a quantitative perspective, the principal output consisted of seven
elaborate sector-specific reports, containing both descriptive and
prescriptive elements.25 2 However, from a qualitative viewpoint,
the most notable product was in the shape of a 1996 summary
report, emphatically identifying fair competition as a condition for
enduring prosperity in Hong Kong's freewheeling economic
setting. 253 This summary report suggested a sharp departure from
the prevailing status quo, unexpectedly recommending that a
comprehensive competition law be adopted and an independent
regulatory body be set up to administer it.25 4
Given its strategic predisposition to err on the side of
nonintervention, and its penchant for incremental adjustments to
the existing state of affairs, the government's lukewarm response
to this ambitious blueprint was more than predictable.2 55 While
acknowledging the need for an active competition policy to
promote Hong Kong's economic efficiency and international
competitiveness, the government expressed reservations about the
broad scope of the framework envisioned by the HKCC and its
256legal underpinnings. The government emphasized the inherent
flexibility provided by administrative guides, or sector-specific
codes of conduct, sustained by Hong Kong's free trade and open




253 See Tsang, supra note 247; see also Hong Kong Consumer Council, Competition
Policy: The Key to Hong Kong's Future Economic Success, CONSUMER COUNCIL,
www.consumer.org.hk/website/ws-en/competition_issues/competition-studies/I 996fairt
rade.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2014) ("After seven sectoral reports, the Consumer
Council produced a summary report: 'Fair Competition: the Key to HK's Prosperity'
advocating the establishment of a competition law and competition Authority.").
254 See Hong Kong Consumer Council, supra note 253.
255 See Trade and Industry Bureau, Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, Government Response to Consumer Council's Report Entitled
"Competition Policy: The Key to Hong Kong's Future Economic Success," 1-2,
COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY GROUP (Nov. 1997), www.compag.gov.hk/reference/
brochure.pdf.
256 See id. at 22.
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embracing regulatory scheme.25 7 It further argued that no clear
rules or international standards were available to determine what
constitutes 'fair' or 'unfair' trade practices, and proceeded to cast
doubt on the assertion that the absence of a comprehensive
competition law could undermine Hong Kong's international
standing in economic organizations.258
The government also found no convincing evidence of firms in
the territory engaging on a significant scale in horizontal and
vertical agreements or abusing their market dominance. 25 9 To all
appearances, an elaborate legislative approach would thus serve no
useful purpose; indeed, such a blunt instrument might amount to
regulatory "overkill."2 60 In addition, because decisions regarding
sanctions would have to be preceded by complex investigations, a
cross-sector competition law and supporting infrastructure might
substantially heighten business uncertainty in Hong Kong.2 61 By
the same token, there would unavoidably be adverse consequences
stemming from the proliferation of costly and protracted court
cases.262
Despite such numerous and strong misgivings, and the
negative strategic posture and conservative operating mode
underlying them, the government conveyed, whether for
fundamental or tactical reasons, its intention to accept some of the
HKCC's less far-reaching recommendations.6 More importantly,
it signaled its willingness to take parallel steps to broaden the
range of measures relied upon to enhance Hong Kong's overall
competitive climate. 264 The ideas put forward included: offering a
roadmap to achieve greater policy consistency and transparency;
orienting the entire bureaucratic apparatus toward increasing
market power in all its manifestations; requesting the HKCC to
continue monitoring and reviewing trade practices, as well as
encouraging and helping autonomous trade associations to adopt
257 See id. at 15-17.
258 See id at 4.
259 See id.
260 See id. at 17.
261 See Trade. and Industry Bureau, Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, supra note 255.
262 See id at 16.
263 See id at 28-29.
264 See id.
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relevant codes of conduct; and setting up a Competition Policy
Advisory Group (COMPAG) as a broad-based and high-level
institutional vehicle for assessing compliance, generating new
initiatives, and reviewing progress.2 65
COMPAG has functioned in accordance with its terms of
reference, evaluating in an ongoing fashion the competitive
environment in Hong Kong and producing detailed annual
reports.266 In 2005, the group reached a point where its members
deemed it necessary to undertake a more thorough examination of
the prevailing situation, thus forming a Competition Policy
Review Committee (CPRC) to conduct the study and provide
advice regarding appropriate actions.267 Contrary to the picture
painted by the government in its 1997 response to the HKCC's
recommendations, 268 the CPRC found evidence that anti-
competitive practices began to spread beyond their narrow
traditional confines and reaffirmed, albeit not unanimously, the
HKCC's view that the time was ripe for the introduction of a
comprehensive competition law and a corresponding overhaul of
the regulatory institutional facade.2 69
In November 2006, following the publication of the CPRC
report, the government embarked on a three-month public
consultation exercise to determine community-wide sentiment
with respect to a cross-sector competition law.270 It subsequently
published a detailed outline of such a potential legal instrument in
November 2008.271 The public response to the concept was highly
favorable on both occasions.272 In light of the broad support the
proposal elicited, the government proceeded to introduce the
265 See id. at 14.
266 See Annual Reports, COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY GROUP, www.compag.gov
.hk/report/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
267 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, COMPETITION
POLICY ADVISORY GROUP, http://www.compag.gov.hk/report/CompagReport-2011-
12_Eng.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
268 See Trade and Industry Bureau, Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, supra note 255.
269 See Competition Policy Review Committee, Report on the Review of Hong
Kong's Competition Policy, COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BUREAU (June
2006), www.cedb.gov.hk/citb/doc/en/PolicyResponsibilities/cprc.pdf.
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Competition Bill into LegCo on July 14, 2010.273 LegCo, in turn,
established a committee to study the bill.274 After lengthy scrutiny,
the bill was passed by LegCo on June 14, 2012, becoming the
Competition Ordinance.27 5
The academic literature on the dynamics of policy agendas is
not entirely helpful in shedding light on the long journey of the
selectively and weakly embraced notion that a broad-based
approach to the problem of excessive market power is warranted to
it gaining wide acceptance and becoming enshrined in law. It is
not entirely clear what factors played a decisive role in propelling
the issue from the informal (or systemic) to the formal (or
institutional) agenda, with the government according it serious
attention. 276 The HKCC raised awareness of the cross-sector
dimension of anti-competitive practices, which made it the "policy
entrepreneur"2 77 that opened a "policy window" through a process
of "outside initiation."27 8
At the same time, the government's contribution, deliberate or
otherwise, cannot be overlooked. Its motives may have been
tactical rather that strategic, but the government chose to keep the
window open by creating and institutionalizing COMPAG,
allowing for a significant element of "inside initiation"2 79 in the
progressive reconceptualization of the problem. The government
bought ample time by establishing COMPAG, during which the
status quo was comfortably maintained, but it also co-opted
outsiders into the monitoring apparatus and "routinized the policy
window, 280 rendering the ultimate outcome almost inevitable.
The lesson may well be that institutional routines, at least in a
pluralistic or semi-pluralistic setting, may exert considerable
influence over the evolution of policy agendas, materially
diminishing the power of policy controllers to shape them at will.
273 See id.
274 See id.
275 See id. at 2.
276 See HOWLETT, RAMESH & PERL, supra note 235, at 104-05.
277 See id. at 104.
278 See id.
279 See id.
280 See id. at 105.
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B. The Competition Ordinance
This new instrument, the product of incremental adaptation
entailing a fundamental redesign of a strategically and structurally
enduring regulatory regime, is an elaborate institutional
mechanism whose purpose is to prohibit and deter undertakings
throughout the whole economy from engaging in anti-competitive
behavior which is aimed at or has the effect of preventing,
restricting, or distorting competition in Hong Kong. 281 An
"undertaking," in this context, is defined as any entity, irrespective
of its legal status or mode of finance, involved in economic
activity, including a natural person taking part in such activity.28 2
Broadly speaking, the Competition Ordinance imposes binding
constraints in three key areas of anti-competitive behavior-
referred to as the "first conduct rule," the "second conduct rule,"
and the "merger rule" (known collectively as the "competition
rules").283 The first of these rules prohibits agreements, concerted
practices, and decisions of an association of undertakings that aim
at or have the effect of preventing, restricting, or distorting
competition in Hong Kong. 284 Four types of anti-competitive
behavior-price-fixing, market allocation, output control, and bid
rigging-are deemed to constitute serious departures from the
prescribed norm under this rule. 285  The second conduct rule
addresses excessive market power and prohibits an undertaking
from abusing its position by engaging in practices that aim at or
have the effect of preventing, restricting, or distorting competition
in Hong Kong. 286 Finally, the merger rule applies to merger and
acquisition activity that is likely to have the same impact on the
territory's competitive environment as the other two prohibitive
281 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 4;
see also LegCo, Competition Ordinance, www.legco.gov.hk/yrl l-12/english/ordO14-12-
e.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
282 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 4;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
283 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 4;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
284 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 4;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
285 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 4;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
286 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 4;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
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measures (subject to the general qualification that the scope of this
rule cannot be said to be wide, given that it is limited to carrier
licenses granted under the Telecommunications Ordinance [Cap.
106]).287
This cross-sector, rule-based normative framework is
underpinned by enforcement machinery that divides the powers of
investigation, prosecution, and adjudication between the
Competition Commission and the Competition Tribunal. 288 The
former is expected to enjoy the status of an independent statutory
body, employ its powers to investigate relevant complaints, and
bring public enforcement cases before the latter. 289 The
Competition Commission's membership is supposed to range from
no less than five to no more than sixteen. 29 0 The appointments will
be made by the Hong Kong Chief Executive.2 9 1
The Tribunal will constitute an integral part of the judiciary,
functioning as a superior court of record, whose primary
jurisdiction is to hear and adjudicate cases brought up by the
Commission. 29 2 Its remit will include follow-on private actions,
alleged contravention of a conduct rule as a defense raised in
proceedings before the Court of First Instance (CFI), and review of
certain determinations of the Commission.29 3 All CFI judges will
be members of the Tribunal, which will be able to apply a full
array of traditional remedies for contravention of a competition
rule.294
The Commission will serve as the principal, but not sole
287 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 4;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
288 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 3;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
289 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 4;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
290 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 4;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
291 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 4;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
292 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 5;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
293 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 5;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
294 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 5;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
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institutional channel, for public enforcement. 295 As indicated, the
Competition Ordinance also provides a legal mechanism for
follow-on private actions to be brought before the Tribunal by
persons who have suffered damage or loss as a result of anti-
competitive behavior that has been determined by the courts to be
a contravention of a conduct rule.2 96
The application of the Competition Ordinance is not uniformly
static in that exemptions and exclusions to the rules of conduct are
envisioned and stipulated.2 97 The underlying logic is to enhance
overall economic efficiency, ensure compliance with legal
requirements, and honor government obligations stemming from a
desire to promote the public interest in general and facilitate the
performance of specific tasks in particular. 2 98 This extends to the
issuance of block exemptions.2 99 Thresholds are also employed in
order to exclude instances of conduct of lesser significance from
the ambit of the Ordinance.oo
The new law does not bind the government, reflecting the
assumption that public sector activities are predominantly non-
economic in nature. 301 By the same token, key parts of the
Ordinance (relating to the competition rules, as well as
enforcement by the Commission and Tribunal), do not apply to
statutory bodies, unless the Hong Kong Chief Executive in
Council determines otherwise by way of regulations. 30 2 In a
similar manner, the CE is empowered to refrain from applying
these parts of the Ordinance to a person specified or a person who
295 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 5-
6; see also LegCo, supra note 281.
296 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 6;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
297 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 6;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
298 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 6;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
299 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 6;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
300 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 6;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
301 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 6;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
302 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 6;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
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is engaged in an activity specified in the regulation."'
At face, this institutional blueprint, long in the making and
thus for all appearances conceptually time-tested, seems to be
consistent with the majority of preferences expressed by
stakeholders who participated in the public consultation exercises.
However, the notion of comprehensively regulating competitive
behavior in Hong Kong remains shrouded in controversy.
Moreover, the particular legal instrument that has been adopted for
this purpose has not proved immune to criticism. Whether readily
or reluctantly, the government has taken a quantum leap, but the
debate regarding the desirability and form of its initiative
continues, albeit inevitably with less intensity than before it had
become afait accompli.
C. Support and Reservations
The principal catalyst for radical change on that front has
clearly been the influential 1996 HKCC summary report. While
unenthusiastically received by the policy establishment, it has set
in motion forces that the government has struggled to contain.
Yet, the report has not been the sole source of pressure for shifting
toward a more holistic governance configuration. The academic
and professional communities have been sharply divided on this
issue, but some scholars have taken a stance broadly consistent,
although not in every respect, with that of the consumer protection
agency and have provided their blessing, even if somewhat
qualified, for the idea of cross-sector regulation of competition in
Hong Kong.304
303 See Competition Policy Advisory Group Report 2011-2012, supra note 267, at 6;
see also LegCo, supra note 281.
304 See CHENG & WU, supra note 200, at 225-33; see also Edward K.Y. Chen &
Ping Lin, Competition Policy Under Laissez-Faireism: Market Power and its Treatment
in Hong Kong, 21 REV. OF INDUS. ORG. 145, 145-66 (2002) ("This paper describes the
current competition policy framework in Hong Kong: how [it] came into existence, what
business practices are prohibited, and how the enforcement system works."); see also
Ping Lin & Edward K.Y. Chen, Fair Competition under Laissez-Faireism: Policy
Options for Hong Kong, LINGNAN UNIVERSITY, http://www.ln.edu.hk/econ/staff/
plin/Fair/20Competition%20under/20Laissex%20Faireism.pdf (last visited Aug. 20,
2014) ("[T]he CPRC recommends that the following seven types of business practices be
regulated: price fixing, bid-rigging, market allocation, sales and production quotas, joint
boycott, discriminatory standards, and abuse of dominant market position."); Tsang Shu-
Ki, The Case for a Competition Institution in Hong Kong, SKTSANG (Nov. 2, 2000),
www.sktsang.com/Archivell/tsang02 1100.PDF ("[M]arket dynamics in more mature
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Those favoring a fundamental departure from the time-honored
hands-off approach have accepted the basic premise that, if looked
at from a domestic perspective: (1) competition leads to lower
prices, better output quality, and wider consumer choice; (2)
downward pressure exerted on prices of intermediate inputs
enhances competitiveness of downstream industries that rely on
them in their production processes; (3) a soundly formulated
comprehensive competition policy serves as a consistent and
equitable strategic framework for guiding both local and foreign
firms; and (4) an effective adoption of such a framework in fact
diminishes the need for government micro-level intervention in the
economy.3 0s
They have also expressed support for the argument that the
implementation of a cross-sector competition policy would
constitute a sensible tactical initiative from an international
viewpoint. 306 This claim stems from the assumption that
promoting competitive practices in the global arena may be
regarded as a viable alternative, or at least an antidote, to
protectionist measures employed by developed countries in an
effort to defend their markets against supposedly predatory
strategies pursued by Asian exporters and domestic enterprises.30 7
If this contention is valid, it follows that Hong Kong is in a
vulnerable position as a strong free-trade advocate and a
vociferous critic of protectionism, because it has long and
tenaciously resisted the idea of promulgating a meaningful
competition law.30 s
A number of analytical and normative assertions have been put
forward emphatically in this context, particularly regarding the
efficiency-boosting consequences of promoting a competitive
business environment through legal means and the distinct nature
of this strategy. Economists have thus noted that a pro-
competition policy is not a "zero-sum game" designed to benefit
economies has been such that dominant players with increasing power are rapidly
emerging, some through mergers and acquisitions, in formerly un-regulated sectors or
across sectors, regulated or otherwise.").
305 See CHENG & WU, supra note 200, at 225.
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consumers at the expense of 'mighty' corporations. 0 9 Rather, it
may increase overall efficiency or social welfare by raising both
consumer and producer surplus via the elimination or
minimization of market distortions stemming from imperfect
competition.1 o
Utilizing the law to curtail such distortions is the ultimate
objective, rather than a reflection of an ideological agenda whose
purpose is to shift power from large to small and medium-size
enterprises. " The formal regulatory approach is essentially
dimension and sector neutral. 312 The legal edifice is constructed
with the aim of curbing the abuse of market power, not denying its
possession, and certainly not handicapping efficient businesses by
punishing corporate success." Importantly, the law is not an
interventionist vehicle because it merely establishes the rules of
the game and provides refereeing mechanisms.3 14
A possible concern is that Hong Kong's image as a lightly
regulated and open economy, functioning in an efficient and
transparent fashion, may undergo palpable erosion.3 1  A potential
counterargument is that, formally speaking, the existence of legal
machinery to control anti-competitive practices is not a factor that
enters into the equation when assessing the degree of economic
freedom prevailing in a country or a broadly equivalent semi-
autonomous political system.3 16 Indeed, it is not unreasonable to
suggest that policies aimed at enhancing efficiency by establishing
a level playing field through a competition law may favorably
impact Hong Kong's image and standing as a bastion of free
enterprise."
Another critical claim that has been addressed is that the small
size of the Hong Kong economy obviates the need for legal
measures to ensure that businesses adhere to acceptable
309 See Lin & Chen, Fair Competition under Laissez-Faireism: Policy Options for
Hong Kong, supra note 304, at 11.
310 See id. at 11, 19, 40.
31' Seeid. at 31-35.
312 See id. at 40.
313 See id. at 11.
314 See id. at 11-13.
315 See Lin & Chen, supra note 304, at 12.
316 See id. at 12-13.
317 See id. at 13.
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competitive standards. 18 This contention merits attention because
it is commonly posited that in such a limited economic space,
threats to competition are relatively rare and steps to increase the
number of competitors are not likely to serve a useful purpose.
This view may be disputed on the grounds that the number of
competitors should not be equated with the level of competition: 32 0
"[h]aving a given number of competitors in a market, no matter
how small the market is, does not mean that these competitors
choose to compete."3 11
In fact, the proposition that large economies are the arena
where challenges to competition are most expected to emerge is
not entirely valid.32 2 The opposite may well be true.323 Empirical
evidence and theoretical support may be adduced to demonstrate
that small size is often associated with elevated industrial
concentration ratios, 32 4 high barriers to entry, 3 25 and a substantial
degree of aggregate economic concentration.326 Moreover, while
Hong Kong's population is rather modest, its economy, as
reflected in widely relied-upon indicators such as the gross
domestic product (GDP), is by no means small.32 7 The size factor
may thus not be greatly pertinent in this context.
Proponents of a broad-based, enshrined-in-law strategy to
combat anti-competitive practices have also found merit in most,
albeit not all, of the specific HKCC recommendations.
Suggestions to impose restrictions on horizontal business
agreements (e.g., bid rigging and cartel-inspired price-fixing),32 8




321 Lin & Chen, supra note 304, at 9.
322 See id.
323 See id.
324 See id. at 10.
325 See id. at 10-11.
326 See id. at 11.
327 See Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC), Economic and Trade
Information on Hong Kong, HKDTC RESEARCH, http://hong-kong-economy-
research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Market-Environment/Economic-and-Trade-
Information-on-Hong-Kongletihk/en/1/1XOOOOOO/IXO90VUL.htm (last visited Sept. 9,
2014).
328 See CHENG & WU, supra note 200, at 228-29.
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enforced through market dominance), 329 complex monopoly (e.g.,
tacit collusion),' and mergers and acquisitions"' have thus been
either wholly embraced or subject to certain qualifications. The
sole proposal to elicit an unfavorable response has been that
directed at vertical agreements (e.g., exclusive dealerships, long-
term supply contracts, retail price maintenance, and tie-in-sales).3 32
However, such analytically and empirically underpinned
elaborate logic has failed to sway skeptics, whose misgivings have
typically been articulated in libertarian terms, both general and
precise.33 3 In addition, technical reservations have been expressed
about the provisions of the Competition Ordinance.3 " The general
philosophically grounded line of reasoning remains that, even
without such a regulatory mechanism, Hong Kong has consistently
been "rated the freest and most competitive economy on the
planet.""' This by no means should be construed as a paradox,
because the territory's "current 'competition regulator' is its
economic freedom and open market."33 6
The precise argument is couched more dispassionately. It is
predicated on the assumption that anticompetitive business
practices have two distinct origins: first, in competition sapping,
privately derived power constellations and second, distortions
stemming from interventionist public policies-and it is the latter
that are the more costly and persistent. 3 In this context, concerns
emanating from the opposite intellectual camp regarding
329 See id. at 230-31.
330 See id. at 231.
331 See id. at 232.
332 See id. at 229-30.
333 See Dan Ryan, How to Make Hong Kong Uncompetitive, WALL STREET JOURNAL
(Apr. 2, 2008, 12:01 AM), online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl20708273137381351;
Richard Y.C. Wong, Understanding Competition in Hong Kong, HONG KONG CENTRE
FOR ECON. RES., http://www.hkcer.hku.hk/Letters/v20/rwong.htm (last visited Aug. 20,
2014); Richard Y.C. Wong, What Is the Purpose of a Competition Policy?,
WANGYUJIAN.COM (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.wangyujian.com/?p-1988&lang-en.
334 See Christoph Kober, Hong Kong Competition Law Riddled with Uncertainty,
Legal Experts Say, THE ASSET (Oct. 24, 2012), mobile.theasset.com/inside.php?tid=
22967.
335 Ryan, supra note 333.
336 Id.
337 See Wong, Understanding Competition in Hong Kong, supra note 333; Wong,
What Is the Purpose of Competition Policy?, supra note 333.
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endogenously induced departures from perfect competition are
discarded because they fail to draw a distinction between market
statics and dynamics.' At any particular juncture, concentration
of corporate power and its adverse consequences may be observed
(market statics), even in freewheeling Hong Kong, but if a longer
time horizon is adopted (market dynamics), it becomes evident
that that such patterns are inherently unstable and do not present a
lasting challenge, particularly in an environment of unfettered
capitalism (where monopolies and cartels unravel in the face of
intense internal and external pressures)."'
Business dominance that is the product of government
regulation (interventionist monopoly and oligopoly) is viewed as
more damaging and entrenched.3 4 0 Two examples are invoked to
buttress this claim.3 41 One involves the monopolistic arrangement
for the distribution of mainland China beef in Hong Kong, and the
other refers to the duopolistic configuration (due to time-honored
and rigid licensing policies) prevailing in the broadcasting
industry. 342 in such circumstances, the effective removal of
harmful and unnecessary barriers to entry imposed and maintained
by the government could reshape the competitive landscape and
enhance efficiency to a greater extent than a legally based wide-
ranging regulatory regime.343
Deficiencies of the Competition Ordinance that critics have
chosen to highlight have been of a largely technical nature.3 4 4
Above all, the new law has been portrayed as rather limited in
scope and vague in certain respects. 345 For instance, the potential
difficulties posed by mergers and acquisitions have not been
adequately addressed.346 By the same token, a number of key
concepts have not been unambiguously defined. 347 This includes
'market power' and 'undertaking,' where conflicting
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interpretations may prove highly problematic. 348  However, the
more fundamental issues discussed earlier, pertaining to the
system's overall architecture, deserve closer academic and policy
attention.
VI. Macroscopic Assessment and Concluding Observations
The literature on the normative facets of business regulation in
its various forms, its merits and demerits, is considerable and is
expanding at a fast pace.3 49 This reflects the increasing role of the
activity, its multidimensional character, the serious questions to
which it gives rise, and the weighty challenges it confronts.* In a
recent survey, taking into consideration the latest trends in the
field, the authors contend and demonstrate that research on the
subject is likely to dramatically accelerate due to the emergence of
a "world risk society," which features the proliferation of threats to
humankind, other biological species, and the physical
environment-such as defiant rogue states, escalating climate
change, heightened financial fragility, and large-scale terrorism.5
The normative thrust manifests itself most palpably in the
methodological and related domains where substantial intellectual
resources are invested in a quest for acceptable and workable
instruments to gauge the impact of regulatory endeavors targeting
business, both in the domestic and global arenas.352 This is a quest
348 See id.
349 See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOs, GLOBAL BUSINESS
REGULATION (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) (presenting several case
studies of the interactions between regulation and normative issues, including property,
corporations, labor standards, nuclear power, drugs, food, and others); ANDRE NIJSEN ET
AL. (eds.), BUSINESS REGULATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (New York: Springer, 2009)
(presenting various essays which attempt to explain how to tailor regulations most
effectively so that businesses are able to comply.); ALBERTO ALEMANNO ET AL. (eds.),
BETTER BUSINESS REGULATION IN A RISK SOCIETY (2013) (discussing how to address
social risks by implementing regulations).
350 See NIJSEN ET AL. (eds.), supra note 349; ALEMANNO ET AL. (eds.), supra note
349. See generally BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 349 (discussing marked
increases across various sectors in a multitude of states).
351 See generally ALEMANNO ET AL. (eds.), supra note 349 (discussing how the
world has changed to be a "world risk society").
352 See generally id.; BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 349; NIJSEN ET AL. (eds.),
supra note 349; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF
REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002) (discussing a cost-benefit analysis applied to
governmental regulations).
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that has yielded a wide array of insights, ranging from the
philosophical to the practical, but ultimately the focus has tended
to gravitate toward the practical end of the continuum. This focus
places a particularly heavy emphasis on identifying sound
principles and techniques for determining whether specific
strategies relied upon to regulate business competition are worth
implementing."'
The principal tool resorted to for this purpose remains cost-
benefit analysis, as traditionally construed and employed.354 It is a
clearly delineated, but not inelastic, assessment procedure, or more
broadly speaking, a vehicle applied in a variety of regulatory
contexts, rather than merely in relation to departures from
competitive market norms." A well-established variant of this
method is cost-effectiveness analysis. "' Additional
complementary techniques include actuarial estimates, engineering
approaches, econometric studies, expenditure appraisals, expert
opinion investigations, general equilibrium models, monitoring of
consumer behavior, prescriptive decision theories, productivity
measures, risk assessment methods, valuation metrics, and
willingness-to-pay surveys."'
The narrow ambit of such research strategies should not be
overstated. A case in point is the commendable effort to
incorporate psychological consequences, both positive and
353 See BRAITHWAITE AND DRAHOS, supra note 349; SUNSTEIN, supra note 352.;
ALEMANNO ET AL. (eds.), supra note 349.; EINAR HOPE (ed.), COMPETITION POLICY
ANALYSIS (2000) (discussing methodological and analytical issues in competition
policy); see MANFRED NEUMANN, COMPETITION POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND
PRACTICE (2001); JOSEF DREXL, WOLFGANG KERBER, & RUPPRECHT PODSZUN (eds.),
COMPETITION POLICY AND THE ECONOMIC APPROACH: FOUNDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
(2011); ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE, & MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING
REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE (2011). see generally NIJSEN ET AL.
(eds.), supra note 331 (discussing the Standard Cost Model as a method of measuring
compliances costs).
354 See BALDWIN, CAVE, & LODGE, supra note 353, at 315-37; Francis Chittenden,
Stefano lancich, & Brian Sloan, Techniques Available for Estimating the Impact of
Regulations, in NIISEN ET AL. (eds.), pp. 43-58. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 352
(discussing risk-adverse strategies as compared to those that only evaluate what is to be
gained [the benefits]).
355 See Chittenden, lancich, & Sloan, supra note 354.; BALDWIN, CAVE, & LODGE,
supra note 353. See generally SuNSTEIN, supra note 352 (discussing risk-adverse
strategies as compared to those that only evaluate what is to be gained [the.benefits]).
356 See Chittenden, lancich, & Sloan, supra note 354, at 47.
357 See id. at 45-47, 55-58.
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negative, for consumers into cost-benefit analysis and broadly
equivalent methods.' Nevertheless, it is legitimate to argue that,
almost without exception, the techniques relied upon in this
context are rooted entirely or largely in utilitarian calculus. The
merits and demerits of actual or potential forms of business
regulation hinge on their efficiency, which in the final analysis
reflect the balance between the utilities and disutilities, typically
expressed in monetary terms that they are capable of generating or
in fact yield."'
While controversial, utilitarian logic is not without appeal and
relevance. It is just a matter of contribution versus dominance, or
whether it should be one of a number of factors in the equation or
the sole yardstick consulted. The regulatory arena is
heterogeneous rather than homogenous.6 o It is characterized by
conflicting pressures, which manifest themselves at various
levels."' For instance, with reference to the global regulation of
business, it has been noted that there is considerable tension
between an array of differently positioned actors362 and principles
that often cannot be readily reconciled.6 Efficiency, or net utility,
may thus have to be viewed in conjunction with other pertinent
criteria."
Indeed, in the ongoing debate about the Competition
Ordinance in Hong -Kong, efficiency shares the limelight with
freedom. Both supporters and critics tend to see the relationship as
symbiotic, albeit with either positive or negative effects, in terms
of the influences exerted by this not uniformly embraced policy
initiative. The issue of equity, or fairness, is also addressed,
although cursorily so. However, additional potentially relevant
yardsticks are mostly overlooked. A possible example is
358 See id. at 51, 56.
359 See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 352 (discussing risk-adverse strategies as
compared to those that only evaluate what is to be gained [the benefits]).
360 See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 349, at 475-531 (discussing the
effectiveness of a number of state regulators in a variety of fields).
361 See id.
362 See id. at 475-506.
363 See id. at 506-31.
364 See generally Randall G. Holcombe, The Foundations of Normative Public
Finance, in FRED THOMPSON AND MARK T. GREEN (eds.), HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC FINANCE
1-42 (1998) (discussing the Pareto criteria and other conceptual policy frameworks).
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institutional legitimacy" in an environment where the government
is believed to be increasingly detached from the grassroots
community and facing a crisis of legitimacy.* The Hong Kong
experience may, hence, be regarded as a useful reminder that
regulatory schemes designed to curtail anticompetitive business
practices should be dissected from a multidimensional perspective,
rather than exclusively within the framework of traditional cost-
benefit analysis.
This is not merely an issue of expanding the list of applicable
criteria, but of how broadly to conceptualize the problem or define
the task. The point is that the introduction of a legal instrument
akin to the Competition Ordinance amounts to a reconfiguration of
a significant component of the whole Hong Kong policy fagade, if
faithfully implemented and enhanced. The corollary inevitably is
that examining this development through narrow-angled lenses-
which may be appropriate in other circumstances, with less far-
reaching ramifications-may not be an optimal strategy. Given
the historical backdrop and prevailing socioeconomic order, a
cross-sector targeting of anticompetitive business conduct amounts
to a fundamental change in the governance regime and should be
treated as such.
There is fast growing and increasingly sophisticated literature
on the evaluation of the impact, actual and potential, of such
extensively constructed institutional mechanisms, albeit with a
distinct bias toward those focused on the environment, perhaps
because of the serious challenges humankind faces both
collectively and in specific geographic realms in that particular
domain.16 ' The starting point in this substantial body of academic
work is normally the assumption that the merits or demerits of any
far-reaching regulatory blueprint should be judged in terms of its
ability to bring about tangible progress toward clearly defined
365 See id. at 35-36.
366 See IAN ScoT, POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY IN HONG
KONG (1989). See generally Lo, GOVERNING HONG KONG: LEGITIMACY,
COMMUNICATION, AND POLITICAL DECAY, supra note 109 (discussing the various means
by which the government attempts reform depending solely upon its own bureaucratic
machinery).
367 See generally Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, Assessing the Effectiveness of
Environmental Governance Regimes: Remaining Gaps, 12 INTERDISc. ENVTL. REv. 166,
166-89 (2011) (discussing how regulatory schemes interact with their socioinstitutional
settings).
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governance regime goals."
However, this tends to merely serve as an initial proposition, a
necessary yet insufficient condition, because complex policy
settings are characterized by a close interdependence of system
components. 369 Given this pattern, "cross-regime linkages are
widespread and need to be fully accounted for."3 70 That is not just
a theoretical observation but one with practical connotations due to
its significance as a guiding principle for those engaged in the
assessment of comprehensive regulatory strategies. 171 Indeed,
such researchers now commonly differentiate between the simple
effectiveness and broad consequences of meaningful adjustments
to the governance regime architecture.37 2
The latter are not completely overlooked in scholarly
explorations of the intricacies and virtues of legally underpinned
efforts to curtail threats to healthy business competition.
Notable examples include the tentative examination of the
relationship between such endeavors and income disparities 34
(even inequality in general),s7 1 economic development,17 1 property
rights, " international trade, 37 financial stability, and social
conflict. 3 o The researchers who venture that far afield partially




372 See Mushkat & Mushkat, supra note 367, at 169.
373 See e.g., Agnar Sandmo, Toward a Competitive Society? The Promotion of
Competition as a Goal of Economic Policy, in HOPE (ed.), supra note 353, at 6, 17
(arguing that broader societal efficiency is not always benefited by individual reforms);
see Frederic Jenny, Competition Law and Policy: Achievements and Failures from an
Economic Perspective, in HOPE (ed.), supra note 353, at 20, 22 (asking whether
competition laws benefit the broader goal of economic efficiency); NEUMANN, supra
note 353, at 166-91 (discussing the dichotomy between competition policy and property
rights, international trade policy, and financial stability); Josef Drexl, On the (A)political
Character of the Economic Approach to Competition Law, in DREXL, KERBER, &
PODSZUN (eds.), supra note 353, at 312-36.
374 See Sandmo, supra note 353, at 14-16.
375 See Drexl, supra note 353, at 326-28.
376 See Jenny, supra note 353, at 24-26.
377 See NEUMANN, supra note 353, at 166-75.
378 See id. at 175-79.
379 See id. at 179-83.
380 See Drexl, supra note 353, at 319-20.
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adopt an interdisciplinary perspective and selectively employ
conceptual vehicles grounded in disciplines (political science and
sociology) where economic efficiency is not necessarily deemed to
be the overarching value."'
That said, a persistent gap in the academic writings on the
design and redesign of governance regimes, particularly those
entailing elaborate curbs on anti-competitive business conduct,
remains in the form of a missing link between a grasp of the policy
consequences and the appropriate strategic response. This
inevitably, although not exclusively, involves a careful
consideration of the "fit" between the governance regime, or its
key elements, and the sociopolitical milieu in which it is
embedded. 382 In ecologically oriented studies, where this factor
looms large on the intellectual agenda and in problem solving
contexts, the degree of correspondence between substantial
regulatory schemes and the biophysical environment is widely
recognized as a pertinent assessment criterion."' However, even
there, the next logical step of ascertaining the fit with the
sociopolitical setting, and then drawing inferences regarding
preventive or corrective action, is seldom taken. 384 Possible
exceptions to this generalization in the administrative and legal
space are certain governance regimes for controlling corporate and
individual crime.8 s
A prominent theme in this paper is that the Hong Kong global
metropolis-notwithstanding the reversion to Chinese sovereignty,
which is fraught with unavoidable difficulties due to underlying
institutional incompatibilities and strains-continues to
successfully encapsulate the spirit of dynamic and resilient free-
market capitalism but, at the same time, is socio-politically
handicapped and incapable of attaining a salutary equilibrium.
Five salient features of this complex picture stand out: (1)
381 See NEUMANN, supra note 353, at 187-88. See generally Drexl, supra note 353,
at 312-336 (discussing how various different of disciplines can be applied to understand
the current governmental crisis and attempts at reform).
382 See generally Miron Mushkat and Roda Mushkat, The Institutional Foundations
of Environmental Governance Regimes, 9 INT'L J. OF REG. AND GOVERNANCE 99, 99-120
(2009) (discussing how closely related various regulatory mechanisms are with respect to
the socio-institutional settings they are supposed to regulate).
383 See id. at 105.
384 See id.
385 See id. at 106-08.
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overwhelming power potentially exercised (and misused) by a
domestically unconstrained chief executive who is strongly
attuned to preferences expressed by the upper echelons of the CCP
apparatus in Beijing, but is incapable of mobilizing adequate
strategic support at home; (2) progressive (even if incomplete)
mainlandization of the local institutional fagade and its cultural
underpinnings; (3) a disarticulation/segmentation of the entire
policy machinery; (4) slight erosion of the rule of law; and (5) the
widening chasm between the minimally muddling-through
government and the disaffected grassroots community. These
features combine to materially diminish state capacity and its
effectiveness as a refereeing instrument.
The theoretical argument from a dynamic perspective is that,
unless sustained by inherently restrictive and thus misguided
policy action, market dominance and practices stemming
therefrom contain the seeds of their own destruction, particularly
in the bottom-up driven and untrammeled Hong Kong economic
setting, and may consequently be regarded as not broad enough in
this context. The prevailing (as distinct from an idealistically
determined configuration) structural characteristics and modus
operandi of the territory's quasi-representative institutions (the
executive and legislative branches of government) cannot be
overlooked. It is unrealistic to expect players in that space to be
single-mindedly motivated by a desire to maximize efficiency,
subject to modest constraints implemented in a transparent
fashion, and refrain from distorting the functioning of supposedly
fundamentally healthy and self-correcting private markets. These
players are unlikely to consistently pursue strategies geared toward
significantly curtailing anti-competitive business conduct in Hong
Kong, which is evidently increasing.
One possible antidote to underperforming representative
institutions is a category comprising their non-majoritarian
counterparts.3 8 6 These are organizational entities which are an
integral part of the democratic landscape, but which are indirectly
accountable to the electorate. Indeed, if carefully designed and
386 See Giandomenico Majone, Non-Majoritarian Institutions and the Limits of
Democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-Cost Approach, 157 J. OF
INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 57, 57-78 (2001).See generally Giandominico Majone, Europe's
"Democratic Deficit ": The Question of Standards, 4 EUR. L. J. 5, 5-28 (1998) (discussing
the features of non-majoritarianism and the legitimacy of non-majoritarian institutions).
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nurtured, they may substantially be insulated from the vagaries of
the political process.' Relevant examples are available in many
jurisdictions, with the most notable and visible in this specific case
probably being the still largely independent judiciary, ICAC,
HKMA, SFC, Office of the Commissioner of Insurance, 3 88 and
Communications Authority (CA)." It is legitimate to assert that
these bodies impart a degree of stability and certain vigor to an
otherwise amorphous and directionless institutional system.
If this diagnosis is valid, the Competition Ordinance does in
fact embody a vision that "fits with" Hong Kong's current socio-
political realities. Of course, this is subject to the qualification that
mechanisms must be established to minimize the dangers of
regulatory cartelization and capture. The Ordinance does provide
some safeguards in this respect (e.g., the judicial component),
although it is a moot point whether they are sufficient and whether
this issue has received adequate attention. The question of the
overall fit does not merely concern the underlying vision, or the
architecture, but also the fine detail, or the engineering,
particularly in relation to enforcement. Unfortunately, the intense
and wide-ranging debate has not been couched, explicitly or
implicitly, in these precise terms at either vision level or at the fine
detail level. The assessment offered thus contains gaps and is not
properly balanced. It follows that the evaluative framework that
has been erected does not just lack one vital element, but a truly
solid foundation.
The general inference to be drawn is that establishing such a
foundation, whose shape may vary across geographic space and
over time, is a prerequisite for a satisfactory appraisal of
meaningful adjustments to governance regimes in domains such as
business competition, where multiple stakeholders and values
follow conflicting paths in a fluid and intricate environment. A
strategic reconfiguration in this crucial realm and similarly
387 See Majone, Non-Majoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic
Governance: A Political Transaction-Cost Approach, supra note 386. See generally
Majone, Europe's "Democratic Deficit ": The Question of Standards, supra note 386, at
10 (discussing how economic integration without political integration can be a reality
only if the two are adequately separated from one another).
388 See Welcome Message, OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF INSURANCE,
www.oci.gov.hk/about/index.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
389 See COMMC'N AUTHORITY, www.coms-auth.hk/en/home/index.html (last visited
Aug. 20, 2014).
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complex spheres of regulatory activity cannot be undertaken
without due reference to the cultural and institutional impacts of
any measures to be implemented. The sociopolitical ramifications
must be fully explored-ideally as early as practically possible in
order not to lose sight of the broad context in which all other
analytical endeavors need to be placed. The degree of cultural and
institutional, or sociopolitical fit is an essential component of the
decision calculus in such circumstances, too often overshadowed
by narrowly focused considerations reflecting traditional-style
utilitarian logic.
If this reading of the intricacies of governance regime design
and redesign is appropriate, there may be no universally applicable
optimal model for regulating business competition and other
roughly similar private sector activities, notwithstanding the
powerful trend toward cross-border convergence and integration in
pivotal domains of human activity. Jurisdictions such as Hong
Kong do not have to reinvent the proverbial wheel, but should
fruitfully seek inspiration from lessons obtained elsewhere.
Indeed, this continues to remain a useful starting point for both
theoretically oriented and practically-inclined researchers in their
ongoing quest for policy enlightenment. However, any
conclusions acquired in the process may not productively be
implemented without fine-tuning, aimed at securing a good fit with
local conditions, in the broadest sense of the term. Even
Singapore, a city-state and a global metropolis rivaling Hong
Kong, yet overlapping with it in several respects, cannot provide
Hong Kong with an exhaustive set of ideas for successfully
combating anti-competitive business conduct. 390 From this
perspective, the creation and enhancement of governance regimes
must be viewed as a strategically driven art as much as a rigorous
economic science.
Comparative law is a conceptually and empirically (from a
factual standpoint) mature realm of scientific inquiry. However, it
lacks a robust methodological framework for systematically
juxtaposing legal instruments adopted in one jurisdiction with
390 Singapore's decade-old competition law and policy are outlined and reviewed in
CAVINDER BULL, LIM CHONG KIN, & RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN
SINGAPORE (2009). Australia's comparatively rich and elaborately analyzed experience
is also selectively relevant. See RUSSELL V MILLER, MILLER's AUSTRALIAN
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY, 2d (2012).
351
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
those embraced in another, where both display some crucial
similarities and some important differences (e.g., Hong Kong
versus Singapore). However, such frameworks, ranging from
qualitative to quantitative, have been developed by social scientists
and are widely applicable, including within various branches of
law."' The emphasis on the cultural and institutional uniqueness
of country-specific regulatory mechanisms should thus not be
construed as an endorsement of a position that cross-border
learning is not a practical and valuable pursuit in this context.
Quite the contrary, if undertaken in accordance with well-
established methodological principles, conducive to seeking
relevance in the face of multiple sociopolitical convergences and
divergences, such broad-based learning may greatly facilitate the
challenging task of configuring, and reconfiguring, governance
regimes.
A possible analytical tool to employ in systematically
addressing the cultural and institutional dimension of substantial
regulatory initiatives, focused on business competition or related
issues, is counterfactual scenario construction.392 Originally relied
upon in the field of economic history to answer "what-if'
questions known as counterfactuals, or to determine historical
patterns which would have potentially materialized in the absence
of key events (an exercise that involves engagement in
counterfactual or hypothetical history)," counterfactual scenario
construction is now commonly resorted to by social scientists.394
If properly used, taking into account Hong Kong's cultural and
institutional realities, it could have probably yielded insights
391 See Roda Mushkat, Killing the Proverbial Two Birds with One Stone: New Ways
to Expand the Comparative Law Methodological Repertoire and Enhance the
Effectiveness of Inter-Jurisdictional Environmental Governance Regimes, 6 TRADE,
LAW, AND DEVELOPMENT (forthcoming 2014).
392 See generally Jianhua He, A Counterfactual Scenario Simulation Approach for
Assessing the Impact of Farmland Policies on Urban Sprawl and Food Security in a
Major Grain-Producing Area of China, 37 APPLIED GEOGRAPHY 127, 127-38 (2013)
(discussing how purely statistical models are inadequate to assess policy impact and
should instead be supplemented by spatially explicit modeling).
393 See generally ROBERT W. FOGEL, RAILROADS AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC
GROWTH: ESSAYS IN ECONOMETRIC HISTORY (Baltimore) (discussing various hypothetical
situations in order to prove economic points).
394 See generally He, supra note 392 (discussing how purely statistical models are
inadequate to assess policy impact and should instead be supplemented by spatially
explicit modeling).
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insufficiently generated during the debate preceding and following
the decision to confront anti-competitive business practices in the
territory in an authoritative and comprehensive fashion (e.g., what
would be the consequences, given the sociopolitical backdrop, of
adhering to the status quo and not implementing situation-
compatible interventionist blueprints?).
The quest for governance regime constellations that satisfy the
"fit" criterion highlighted in this paper must inevitably be
supported by qualitative or "soft" research methods such as
counterfactual scenario construction, because alone, widely relied
upon efficiency-centered counterparts (e.g., cost-benefit analysis)
cannot provide a solidly underpinned roadmap. The understanding
of the descriptive, explanatory, prescriptive, and technical
dimensions of strategically oriented public regulation of private
sector activity has greatly increased in recent years, but it is not
devoid of crucial gaps, reflecting an overly narrow problem
definition and methodological thrust. The intellectual controversy
and tension surrounding Hong Kong's belatedly born Competition
Ordinance serves as a useful reminder that this continues to be the
case and that the knowledge-building process needs to be
significantly broadened.3 95
395 See Thomas Cheng, Convergence and its Discontents: A Reconsideration of the
Merits of Convergence of Global Competition Law, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 433, 433-90
(2012).
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